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Abstract
For years now, public education, and especially public higher education, has been under attack. 
Funding has been drastically reduced, fees increased, and the seemingly irresistible political force 
of ever-tightening austerity budgets threatens to cut it even more. But I am not going to take the 
standard line that government financial support for public higher education should be increased. 
I view that battle as already lost. What I am going to propose is that we stop arguing about the 
allocation or reallocation of ever more scarce public resources and think of another way to fund 
public higher education. It is time for a new approach, one that satisfies the left’s claim that higher 
education should be affordable for all, yet one that does not involve increasing the expenditure 
of public funds or committing the government to entitlement programs that it cannot now or at 
least cannot long afford. What we need is a new proposal that is acceptable to both sides if we 
are to bring public education into the twenty-first century. And this is what this article is devoted 
to providing.
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Education has long been seen as a principal source of economic mobility (see, for exam-
ple, Berger and Fisher, 2013). Economic mobility, in turn, has long been seen as an 
important cure not only for poverty but also for exploitation, for exploitation tends to 
decrease as one moves up in economic class (see Reiff, 2013). But for years now, public 
education, and especially public higher education, has been under attack. In my own 
state of California, for example, we have gone from having one of the best systems of 
public education in the country – indeed, one that was the envy of the entire world – to 
one that is among the worst systems in the 50 states and sinking. California was ranked 
46th among the 50 US states in K-12 spending per student in 2010–2011, 47th in 
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education spending as a share of personal income, and 50th (i.e. dead last) with respect 
to the number of students per teacher (California Budget Project, 2011). More than 50% 
of students entering the California State University system cannot meet basic require-
ments in English and in Math (Lewin and Markoff, 2013). But while the lack of public 
financial support for public education first began gutting programs at the primary and 
secondary levels, California’s system of public higher education, like state support for 
higher education everywhere, is now well on its way to being gutted too (see State Higher 
Education Executive Officers, 2012). Throughout the nation, state support of public uni-
versities is at its lowest level in 25 years, and state budget cuts as high as 20%–30% 
threaten ‘to cripple [what were] many of the nation’s leading state universities and erode 
their world-class quality’ (Courant et al., 2010). States now spend one-fifth less per pub-
lic college student than they did a decade ago, and ‘state funding per-student in the 
University of California system has been cut in half over the past 10 years, from approxi-
mately $18,000 in 2002 to $9,000 per student [in 2012]’ (Block, 2012).1 As a result, 
despite the fact that fees for tuition, room, and board have been rising faster than infla-
tion for the last 20 years, public universities have been forced to make deep cuts to make 
up for this hole in their budgets (see Leonhardt, 2013a). The cuts in California and in 
other states are so deep that rather than making a special effort to target low-income 
students, for whom access to public institutions of higher education is essential, many 
admissions directors at public universities are being forced to increase their efforts to 
attract ‘full pay’ students, and are still finding themselves unable to make up the differ-
ence (see Freedman, 2013; Peña, 2013).
Not surprisingly, this gutting of the higher public education system in the United 
States has seriously eroded the standing of the US system relative to the rest of the world:
As recently as the mid-1970s, the U.S. was the clear frontrunner in the percentage of 25-34 year 
olds with some level of college attainment – whether two years, four years, or beyond. Based 
on the most recent data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the 
U.S. (with 41 percent) now ranks 16th among 36 developed countries in college attainment, 
behind South Korea (63 percent), Canada and Japan (56 percent), and many other countries 
including Russia, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Australia, France and the United Kingdom. 
(Block, 2012)2
As a result,
the upwardly mobile American is becoming a statistical oddity . . . Only 58% of Americans 
born into the bottom fifth of income earners move out of that category, and just 6% born into 
the bottom fifth move into the top. Economic mobility in the United States is lower than in most 
of Europe and lower than all of Scandinavia. (Stiglitz, 2013)
Of course, the decline in support for public education is disturbing not only because 
education is a way of escaping poverty and economic exploitation but also because edu-
cation is an end in itself – as J. S. Mill said,
No intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an 
ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they 
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should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than 
they are with theirs. (Mill, 1998: 57 (ch. 2, para. 6, lines 6–10))
Indeed, most people would agree with Mill that ‘it is better to be a human being dissatis-
fied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied’ (Mill, 
1998: 57 (ch. 2, para. 6, lines 40–42)). We therefore have reason to be concerned that 
government is not fulfilling its moral obligations to its citizens regarding providing them 
an education, quite apart from the bad effects this failure might be having on our com-
mon life.
But even someone who rejects the intrinsic importance of education and its instru-
mental use as a way of escaping poverty and exploitation has other overwhelming instru-
mental reasons for concern. As President Obama recently noted, the current lack of 
financial support for public education is going to have wide-ranging economic effects 
not only on the currently economically disadvantaged but on everyone else too: ‘coun-
tries that out-educate us today will out-compete us tomorrow’ (see Shear, 2010). And 
even in the absence of foreign competition, more and more of the kinds of jobs that can 
support what has come to be thought of as a middle-class lifestyle are requiring a higher 
education, for the manufacturing jobs that used to support such a lifestyle with merely a 
high-school diploma have largely disappeared.3 If the lack of support for public educa-
tion today will make all our lives worse off later, then this is something on which not 
merely economists but also political theorists and moral philosophers should have a say.
The attack that has produced this appalling decline in support for public education has 
consisted of a series of incremental but nevertheless relentless reductions in public fund-
ing, so that fees are now greater (with regard to access to higher education) and the 
educational services provided lesser (both in terms of quantity and, given the size of the 
relevant budget cuts, necessarily in terms of quality too, at all levels of public education) 
than would otherwise be the case.4 The reasons for these reductions are varied and com-
plex – they are in part the result of America’s long history of anti-intellectualism being 
carried forward and indeed intensifying, in part the result of increasing popular opposi-
tion to taxes of any sort, and in part the result of what can only be described as a deliber-
ate effort by those on the extreme right since the 1980s to make the masses more amenable 
to political and economic exploitation, but I shall not focus on the actual motivations of 
those who have led or participated in this attack on public education in this article.5 
Instead, I shall assume that these cutbacks are simply a good faith response to real and 
rising economic pressure – that when public entities have less money, or greater obliga-
tions, cuts have to be made somewhere, and probably everywhere to some extent, and this 
has led to the relentless incremental defunding of all public schools but especially public 
institutions of higher education for some time.6 Because a democracy cannot function 
without an informed electorate, one that is capable of thinking for itself and that cannot 
easily be fooled by demagogues intent on misleading the public regarding the nature and 
causes of its domestic and international problems and their possible solutions, the threat 
this decline in support represents is not limited to the reduction in educational opportuni-
ties for the less fortunate among us – it threatens the very existence of democracy itself.
Indeed, our most enlightened leaders have long recognized this, even though our 
actions have often not lived up to their rhetoric:
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From the beginning American statesmen had insisted on the necessity of education to a republic. 
George Washington, in his Farewell Address, urged the people to promote ‘institutions for the 
general diffusion of knowledge’. To the degree that the form of government gave force to 
public opinion, Washington argued, ‘it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened’. 
The aging Jefferson warned in 1816: ‘If a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of 
civilization, it expects what never was and never will be’. The young Lincoln, making his first 
appeal to a constituency, told the voters of Sangamon County in 1832 that education ‘was the 
most important subject which we as a people could be engaged in’. (Hofstadter, 1963: 299–300 
(quoting Jefferson, 1899: 4; Lincoln, 1953: 8; Washington, 1897: 212))
And it was not so long ago that the Supreme Court reminded us that:
Education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments [given] the 
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most 
basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good 
citizenship.7
Whatever the current economic situation, then, there is good reason to try to come up 
with a solution to the problem of financing public education if a solution is indeed avail-
able. It is time to stop arguing about the allocation or reallocation of ever more scarce 
public resources, and think of another way to fund public higher education. Now don’t 
get me wrong – I am not suggesting that government should get out of the education 
business – there are a great many things that government can do that can help public (and 
private) education prosper, even if providing money is not going to be one of them. I am 
just suggesting that it is time for a new approach, one that satisfies the left’s claim that 
higher education should be affordable for all, yet one that does not involve increasing 
expenditure of public funds or commit the government to entitlement programs that it 
cannot now or at least cannot long afford. We need a new proposal that is acceptable to 
both sides if we are to bring public education into the twenty-first century. And that is 
what this article is devoted to providing.
The proposal
What I am going to propose, then, is that public higher education be absolutely free at the 
point of entry. Not means tested, not cheap, not subsidized, but free. For everybody. 
Rather than an up-front payment, what would be required is a promise, a promise to pay 
a certain amount of one’s federal adjusted gross income (AGI) – say 6% – for one’s 
prime earning years, which in the United States are from 35–54, to the university that 
provides one’s undergraduate degree.8 (I shall not discuss graduate education in this 
article, but do not take this to suggest that I think graduate education should be paid for 
in some other fashion; it is just that the way in which my proposal can be extended to 
cover this should be obvious.9) I propose 6%, but this is only an example, figured on the 
basis of the University of California system, which is the system I know best. The actual 
percentage will need to be calculated for each public institution or group of institutions 
separately, and accordingly could be slightly more or less than this. The calculation 
requires determining the current average total cost of education per student for 
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the relevant student cohort at the time, the current average income of the institution’s 
graduates in their prime earning years, the amount of return required to attract the rea-
sonable investor to a largely risk-free long-term investment, the real rate of interest and 
the target and expected rate of inflation, and certain other factors that I shall get to in a 
moment. But for now, all I want to do is sketch out the rough outlines of my proposal and 
what can be said in favor of it.
Right. So the first thing to notice about my proposal is that it does not require anyone 
to agree to pay a specified sum at or over a specified amount of time. The promise that is 
required to obtain an education does not create a debt in the traditional sense. What the 
promise does create is an equity interest in one’s earning power.10 People who are dead 
by the time their prime earning years roll around, or otherwise have no income at all at 
the time their obligation to begin making payments actually comes due, would pay noth-
ing. People who earned more would pay more, people who earned less would pay less, 
but everyone who was working or otherwise earning income during their prime earning 
years would pay the requisite percentage of their income. Because most people would 
agree (as indeed countless empirical surveys have shown) that one’s ultimate earnings 
are significantly influenced by the amount of education one receives in the vast majority 
of cases,11 the amount paid will bear some relation to the utility of the education received, 
which is often not the case now. While those with high earnings would pay more, they 
should pay more, for they received a greater economic benefit, but since the payment is 
calculated on a percentage basis, the relative pain of these payments should be no greater 
for the rich than for the poor.12 And no one needs to worry about the slavery of the tal-
ented – no one is required to earn anything – it is a percentage of your actual earnings, 
not your potential earnings, that determines how much you have to pay. If you want to 
avoid making any payments by simply refusing to work during your prime earning years, 
you are absolutely free to do so. But since those are your prime earning years, and 94% 
of the money goes to you, I expect few people would be petty enough to take this route. 
Most people will pay and be happy to do so. Yet if you want to write novels rather than 
be an investment banker, you are completely free to do this too – unlike promising to 
repay a debt, having made the promise contemplated by my proposal is designed to have 
no influence at all on which occupation you ultimately choose to pursue. Indeed, people 
who make such a promise are much more free to pursue their preferred occupations than 
those who have borrowed money to pay for their education up front and now have to pay 
it back. So any libertarian concerns here should be more than satisfied. And yet the egali-
tarian ethos of political liberalism is also satisfied, for higher education is available to 
everyone on an equal basis, and no one is required to engage in shameful revelation (i.e. 
prove that they are in need and deserving of the help of others) in order to pay less or 
nothing at all if one’s life doesn’t work out as one expected.13 In this sense, the amount 
promised is not to be seen as an individual commitment but simply as a share of the joint 
commitment made by each incoming cohort or class (as in ‘the Class of 2018’). What 
this amounts to is a promise to pay one’s share of a community benefit, not a promise to 
pay for an individual benefit that exists separate and apart from what the community 
receives.
Well fine, you say, this all sounds great, but there is an obvious problem here. Things 
will be fine in 15 years or so when the first cohort’s prime earning years arrive and all the 
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money starts rolling in, but where are the funds needed to pay for operations until then 
going to come from? Can we really expect government to underwrite the full cost of 
public higher education for 15 years until the cash starts flowing? Under my proposal, 
however, this is not something that government would have to do. Remember, what we 
have here is a large number of promises to pay money in the future. Just like promises to 
repay a loan, these promises can be securitized. That is, they can be stacked together into 
large bundles, divided into slices, and then interests in these slices sold as securities on 
the market now (see generally Reiff, 2013: 240–241). Those who purchased the top 
slices (those in what is usually collectively referred to as ‘the senior tranche’, the word 
‘tranche’ being French for ‘slice’) would be paid first, those who purchased the middle 
slices (those in ‘the mezzanine tranche’) would be paid next, and those who purchased 
the lowest slices (those in ‘the equity tranche’) would be paid last. Owning the lowest 
slices (those in the equity tranche) would accordingly carry the largest amount of risk, 
while those at the top (and in this case the middle too) should be almost risk free. But this 
can be accounted for either by varying the amount of return on equity (the dividend) paid 
by the securities in each tranche or by varying the reserve amount at which the securities 
in each tranche would sell. The riskier the tranche from which each particular security 
comes, the greater the return or the lower the price or some combination of the two.
But wait, you say, this sounds just like a mortgage-backed security, and we all know 
how those turned out. Indeed, before the financial crisis, student loans were often pack-
aged with mortgages to create what are now worthless or nearly worthless securities. As 
part of the lending frenzy triggered by the massive demand for more and more of these 
securities, ‘many lenders actually lowered their underwriting standards so that they could 
originate and then sell off more [student] loans, even if the loans were based on terms the 
borrowers could not possibly fulfill’ (Rampell, 2012d).14 As a result, the cumulative 
amount in default on outstanding private student loans now exceeds US$8b, representing 
over 850,000 distinct defaults, and defaults have become even more inevitable since the 
recession slashed graduates’ job possibilities. So isn’t my proposal simply a recipe for 
yet another financial disaster?
No, it is not, for several reasons. First, although the securities I am proposing are 
constructed in much the same way as mortgage-backed securities,15 we are not securitiz-
ing debt here – under this proposal, no one will be agreeing to pay a set dollar amount; 
they will be agreeing to pay a set percentage of their income, and that percentage will be 
calculated to ensure that it is affordable no matter what amount of income the student 
ultimately earns. Add to this the fact that payments need not begin until the student 
reaches his or her prime earning years (15 years after graduation in most cases), so each 
student has a significant amount of time to get financially settled (even those who go on 
to graduate school) before a portion of his or her income begins to get diverted, which 
makes a failure to pay even less likely (currently, repayments must begin on most student 
loans only months after graduation, and one in six student loans ends up in default) (see 
Martin, 2012a). So we need not be concerned that some people may be entering into 
obligations they cannot keep. Affordability is built into the promise; the only risk is that 
some people may not pay even though they can afford to do so.16
But this is where the government comes in. While both the state and federal government 
will be out of the business of funding public education by guaranteeing student loans or 
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giving grants to students under my proposal, the federal government will still have some-
thing very constructive and important left to do.17 And this is to lend the offerors of these 
securities the massive and highly developed collection and enforcement infrastructure it 
has already established with regard to the payment of taxes. For part of my proposal is to 
use the federal government to monitor, enforce, collect, and process these payments. 
Payments would be calculated on the same forms people use to calculate their taxes (after 
all, the amount due is calculated based on one’s AGI anyway), and be paid by separate 
check (or electronic transfer), which the government would then deposit and forward to the 
registered holder of the security less (perhaps) an appropriate fee for its administrative 
services, which again would be figured into the price of the securities, so it need not be 
borne by taxpayers. Those whose income was so low that they are not required to file a tax 
return would not have any payments to make under my proposal anyway (the percentage 
due would kick in only after the amount of income that could be earned tax free was 
reached), so there would be no problem arising from that. Also, because all US citizens 
with sufficient income are required to file federal tax returns no matter where they might 
live, even if they are living in another country, we need not worry that students would be 
encouraged not to pay if they ended up living somewhere else at the time of payment than 
the state in which they actually received their education. (This is why state enforcement 
through their respective taxing authorities would by itself not be enough)18. True, there 
might be some leakage due to emigration by those willing to give up their US citizenship, 
but this can be solved through collection treaties with the taxing authorities in other nations, 
and so it seems unlikely that large amounts from high-wage earners could go uncaptured. 
Foreign students would have to be excluded from the program and would have to pay up 
front, as they do now, unless they come from a country that enters into a mutual enforce-
ment treaty with us and the political risk of this treaty still being in force in 15 years were 
minimal, but this can be decided on a case-by-case basis. In any event, the threat of enforce-
ment action by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) should keep those US citizens who 
decide not to pay despite being able to afford to do so to a minimum.19 We can also enlist 
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to lend a hand here by requiring that all cor-
porations subject to its jurisdiction certify that their highly compensated officers and direc-
tors (say anyone in the top 1% of the income distribution) are not in default on their 
education promises or risk being subject to treble fines or similar enforcement mecha-
nisms, making it even more unlikely that those with high incomes would not pay their 
share. Whatever the number of defaulters would be in these circumstances, however, this 
number should be fairly predictable, given our past experience calculating the percentage 
of the population that engages in tax evasion, meaning we could design even the bottom 
slices of these educational securities to offer a stream of payments that would be unlikely 
to be affected by these minimal rates of default. People might even change their view of the 
IRS if this institution was not merely collecting taxes but also helping to finance the cost of 
their children’s education. In any event, investors in these securities – unlike those who 
invested in mortgage-backed securities in the past – would have no reason to fear that large 
unanticipated increases in rates of default might occur and consequently wipe them out.
A second reason to distinguish these educational securities from their similarly con-
structed mortgage-backed cousins is that the payments here are inflation protected – 
indeed, because no one is promising to pay a set amount, but rather a percentage of one’s 
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earnings, these amounts should track any increases in inflation rather well. It is this fea-
ture which makes my proposal significantly different from other income-contingent 
repayment schemes, which treat the amount advanced as a loan. With a loan, the stated 
amount of interest is supposed to compensate for inflation, plus provide some degree of 
profit, but it may or may not do so, and it certainly will not do so if payments are capped 
or forgiven by the income-contingent repayment feature. These capped or forgiven pay-
ments also create deficiencies or losses that someone has to bear, and with student loans, 
this usually means the taxpayer. With the securities contemplated by my proposal, in 
contrast, investors get much more assured inflation protection because even though each 
individual’s payment is pegged to his or her income, the investor receives a share of the 
average income for the entire cohort, and this largely wipes out any individual problems 
out. There is no deficiency and therefore no loss for anyone to bear, for the possibility 
that any particular individual may not have sufficient income to pay is figured into the 
original design of the security. Of course, there is a risk that increases in that the average 
wage of a particular cohort may lag behind inflation, but this risk is minimal. Indeed, it 
is far more likely that increases in the average wage will outpace inflation, as they almost 
always have in the past, making these securities attractive even if they were not designed 
to include a real rate of return (i.e. a rate of return above inflation). To make these securi-
ties even more attractive, however, we can design them so they do include a real rate of 
return, so that investors will profit even if increases in average income merely match 
inflation (I will say more about this later). In any event, an investment that is this risk free 
and offers an inflation-protected rate of return is available almost nowhere else in the 
economy today (indeed, most equivalently risk-free investments today are offering an 
effective negative real rate of return),20 so the returns these educational securities offer 
should be highly attractive to investors and, as far as defaults go, the taxpayer is com-
pletely off the hook.
Third, should these investments produce unexpectedly high returns (called alpha 
returns), it need not be the case that only private investors and not the educational institu-
tions that provided these especially successful cohorts with their education would bene-
fit. The alpha return that goes exclusively to investors could be capped and returns above 
this shared between the originating institution and investors rather than going to inves-
tors alone. In other words, if returns were exceptionally high, both the relevant educa-
tional institution and the investors in that institution’s students would share in any 
windfall.
Finally, even if there was an unanticipated high rate of default or inflation outpaced 
increases in average AGI for the relevant cohort to such an extent that it wiped out the 
built-in real rate of return and some investors ended up losing money, this would only be 
in the equity tranche, and even here, the losses should be minimal. Absent some world-
wide cataclysm, it seems almost impossible for any investor to suffer a catastrophic loss, 
for unlike the housing market, the average price of the labor of college graduates rarely 
goes down, at least not significantly and for long periods. And even those who do experi-
ence losses could still feel they had contributed to something worthwhile – not a house 
that now stands abandoned and decaying because its buyers could not afford their mort-
gage, but the education of people. Education once received cannot be lost or repossessed, 
and everybody benefits from having a better educated populace no matter what.21
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Look at what this does. It satisfies the concerns of the left, for everyone would be able 
to get a high-quality higher education no matter what economic resources they or their 
families currently enjoy, which should at least go some way to combating what is increas-
ingly coming to be seen as the ‘inheritability of poverty’ as a socioeconomic characteris-
tic.22 Indeed, the current trend is for an ever greater amount of the financial aid available 
at public institutions to be distributed on the basis of prior academic accomplishment 
rather than need. Because students from financially stable families tend to have better 
academic records than students from more financially stressed ones, this effectively 
means less and less aid is being made available to those who need it most, while more 
and more financial aid is going to the rich (see Rampell, 2013b). That would stop under 
my proposal, for all students would now have access to public higher education at no 
up-front cost. No longer would poor students have to choose between working long 
hours at menial low-wage jobs in order to finance their education, thereby jeopardizing 
their ability to perform well in or even complete their courses,23 and taking on large debts 
they cannot begin to pay, or (in some cases) risking both these catastrophes.24 Rather 
than subjecting students to market risk, as the current US Senate proposal to tie interest 
rates on student loans to market rates does (see Peters, 2013),25 my proposal allows the 
market to work for them and allows them to access private equity capital for the first 
time. And it would also eliminate the need for parents who wished to spare their children 
from having to deal with this dilemma from taking on crushing debt themselves (see 
Lewin, 2012).
This greater access to education is reason enough to opt for my proposed method of 
financing as a matter of public policy, but there is an important additional economic 
benefit as well. While other forms of consumer debt have gone down, student debt has 
continued to rise throughout the Great Recession and has now begun to reach alarming 
proportions.26 Indeed, it is now second in total size only to mortgage debt (see Lee, 
2013).27 Obviously, the potential repayment problem associated with this amount of debt 
not only threatens the financial security of the individual debtors involved, it also has 
ramifications for the entire economy, as those with high levels of student debt will have 
trouble accessing other forms of credit and therefore will have difficulty contributing as 
they otherwise might to effective demand and therefore the growth of the rest of the 
economy. And of course, if large amounts of this debt end up in default, which is a grow-
ing danger if the job market does not improve and these heavily indebted students are 
unable to find jobs that are sufficiently well-paid, we could have a replay of the sub-
prime mortgage crisis in miniature. Indeed, the danger of allowing this highly risky kind 
of debt to continue to grow is reason enough to want to move toward a new method of 
financing higher public education.
Another important benefit of this plan is that it would help re-orient people’s attitude 
toward paying for their higher education. No longer would we be trying to convince 
people that everyone, even those who don’t take advantage of public education, should 
share the burden of funding it. Not that I disagree with this proposition – in fact, I whole-
heartedly support it. But I think the evidence is now irrefutable that we can rely on ham-
mering this idea home to take us only so far, and there is obviously a lot farther still to 
go. Under my proposal, while some government money would still go to institutions of 
higher learning, this would be for activities of theirs that do truly and directly benefit 
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everyone. The specific costs of educating particular people, on the other hand, will be 
paid for by those people themselves, through their ability to attract investors in their 
income-earning abilities. Because people will now be paying for their own education 
(when they begin to pay) rather than the education of others, they should experience less 
psychological aversion to making these payments than they experience now to paying 
equivalent amounts of taxes to cover the defaults of those who are unable to pay for their 
education themselves, even though the net effect of all this may be similar (see McCaffrey 
and Slemrod, 2006: 7–8).28 And this also means that the finances of public institutions of 
higher learning should be less susceptible to the potentially violent budgetary swings in 
state support caused by natural movements in the business cycle.
But most importantly, with the burden of paying for public higher education lifted 
from public entities (approximately US$9.6b in state funds went to public higher educa-
tion in California in 2011–2012, for example (Lederman, 2012)), taxes could go down 
and there would still be plenty of public money left over to redirect toward research and 
development at institutions of higher learning, the acquisition of new buildings and 
equipment, and various outreach programs that are designed to have benefits beyond the 
mere provision of education. For universities do more than simply produce educated 
students: they are centers of research and development and technological innovation; 
they provide health services to large segments of the population; they provide economic, 
political, and scientific advice to government and to the public on a wide range of impor-
tant issues; they are repositories of important historical and cultural information; and so 
on. These are all public goods that are consumed by everyone, not just those who receive 
degrees from these universities, and it is therefore just and proper for taxpayers to pay for 
them. There are accordingly strong reasons for state and federal governments to continue 
to provide financial support to public institutions of higher learning even if the actual 
cost of the education services they provide is itself fully covered through the sale of 
education securities to domestic and international investors. And, of course, states also 
have an incentive to continue to underwrite the living expenses of those consuming edu-
cational services, for my proposal does not contemplate paying for these costs through 
the sale of education securities (I will explain why in a moment) and there is accordingly 
reason to be concerned that some students may be so poor that they cannot cover these 
costs themselves. Even assuming continued government contributions for all these activ-
ities, however, and even assuming that some of the taxpayer money that had been used 
to cover higher education services was returned to the taxpayers in the form of tax cuts, 
there would still be funds left over to redirect to K-12 education, enough at least to bring 
these basic programs back up to a much higher standard.29 My proposal therefore not 
only solves the problem of financing public higher education, by releasing resources that 
had been committed to funding higher education in the past, it also allows government to 
redirect its attention and some of its current resources to fulfilling its obligation to pro-
vide all citizens with a basic education.
Perhaps the most significant advantage of my proposed method of financing, how-
ever, is that it provides a way for the giant pool of investment capital out there in the 
world, including foreign capital, capital which will obviously be drawn to those educa-
tional systems that are the most developed such as those in the United States, to invest in 
public higher education.30 Essentially, it takes the funding of public higher education 
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private – who on the right could fail to support that? And it provides a very attractive 
investment opportunity especially in times of economic distress, when public education 
is otherwise bound to suffer. Indeed, in the absence of some sort of fresh approach, tui-
tion fees are likely to go up substantially in times of economic distress, and this can be a 
significant factor when it comes to determining inflation (at 4-year public universities, 
tuition and other costs have risen 68% over the last 10 years), putting even more pressure 
on the economy and often leading to further reductions in government spending (Blow, 
2013; Castle, 2012). The financial markets are capable of creating all sorts of exotic 
financial instruments, most of which do nothing to assist in the production of anything 
and can be downright destructive (take the now-infamous credit default swap as an 
example); why not use this expertise to design financial instruments that actually do 
something socially constructive? Indeed, it seems like financing public education in the 
way I propose presents one of those very rare kinds of political and economic policies – a 
policy that is a win-win for everybody. The only grounds for anyone to oppose it would 
seem to be that he or she wanted to decrease opportunities for education, and no one cur-
rently admits to wanting that.
Note also that my proposal offers benefits far beyond what is available under current 
law. First, relief is available under current law only for certain kinds of federal direct 
student loans, not for all loans, and only when the required payments exceed 15% of 
‘discretionary income’, not 6% of AGI as in my proposal, although the existing 15% cap 
will drop to 10% for loans taken out after 2012 (Indiviglio, 2011). In contrast, the pro-
gram envisioned in my proposal would apply to everyone who attends public institutions 
of higher learning. Second, under the current program, those who qualify receive an 
income-based cap on loan repayments and forgiveness of any loan balance remaining 
after these reduced payments are made in full, leaving a deficiency that must be covered 
by the taxpayers (see U.S. Department of Education, 2011).31 Australia has a similar 
although more all-encompassing income-contingent student loan scheme, but again, this 
leaves the taxpayer footing the bill for continuing interest subsidies, deficiencies, and 
defaults, estimated at about 20% of all new lending (Norton, 2013).32 Under my pro-
posal, rather than look to taxpayers to cover any of these costs, those who are especially 
successful subsidize those who are not; no deficiencies or unpaid costs would remain. 
Indeed, because of the way the promises are packaged, the money actually used to pay 
for each student’s education comes from investors, not lenders or taxpayers, and there-
fore is not counted as debt on anybody’s financial statement. Finally, and most impor-
tantly, while current law allows for the forgiveness of debt in some cases, forgiveness of 
debt is a taxable event under both federal and state income tax law, and the taxes that 
become immediately due upon such forgiveness may be equivalent to as much as 3 to 5 
to 10 years of payments on these loans, depending on the borrower’s tax bracket at the 
time (see Lieber, 2012a).33 In other words, while my proposal guarantees that no one will 
ever have to pay more than they can afford, the current ‘cap and forgive’ program guar-
antees only temporary relief followed by a big tax bill in the future.34
Of course, the devil is in the details, and there are important details in my proposal 
that I have not yet mentioned. For example, individual institutions cannot be allowed to 
float such securities themselves, or to allow those who are most likely to earn high 
incomes to opt out. The arguments for this are both pragmatic – the proposal will not 
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work if individuals and universities are allowed to do this – and driven by principles of 
justice. In any event, it is these and other limitations that the rest of this article shall be 
dedicated to illuminating. Now that I have sketched an outline of my proposal, I will go 
back over each of its elements and explain in further detail how each element would 
work, and why the various pragmatic rules necessary to make it work are just, and not 
ones to which anyone can reasonably object.
The details
Let me begin by noting the similarities and differences between my proposal and two 
other kinds of proposals for funding public higher education that have been floating 
around for a number of years. The first is the income-contingent student loan (‘income-
contingent loan’ or ‘ICL’). Proposals to finance public higher education through ICLs 
provide for loans to be issued to students directly by the government or perhaps by 
private banks, but in that case fully insured against default by the government. Rather 
than obligate each borrower to repay what he or she has borrowed, however, as in a 
traditional loan, the amount of the loan to be repaid is dependent upon the ultimate 
income of the borrower. Although the exact cutoffs vary, students with low incomes pay 
little or nothing, students with moderate incomes repay most of what they have bor-
rowed, and students above a certain income repay their entire loan.35 My proposal dif-
fers from these programs in that with ICLs, the government (and therefore the taxpayer) 
is on the hook for any principal forgiven and whatever amount of interest ends up being 
waived or subsidized, and the cost of this can be extensive.36 Bridge financing (the 
financing that covers the transition period between when the ICL program starts and 
when the loans begin to be repaid) is also provided by the taxpayer. In contrast, under 
my proposal, students who end up earning low incomes do not have to pay any more 
than they would under an ICL program, the progressivity of the program is more exten-
sive than the typical ICL (students end up having to repay the full amount that they 
borrowed very quickly under most ICLs), and the maximum to be paid is not limited to 
the amount of each individual’s student loan, for there is no loan. Instead, the amount is 
set as a percentage of income, which means that what the student ultimately pays can be 
more or less than what the individual might have borrowed under an ICL program. 
Instead of treating each student as an individual borrowing a specific amount according 
to his or her particular financial needs, we treat the cost of education as a cost of the 
student’s cohort as a whole. Money is raised to pay for this by allowing investors to take 
an equity interest in that cohort’s earning ability as a whole. Bridge financing is pro-
vided entirely by the market, not by the taxpayer, and students who end up earning more 
pay more, and students who end up earning less pay less, but no liability falls on the 
taxpayer to bring the total amount paid by the cohort up to some preset amount. Rather 
than specify the amount each student has to pay, as in a loan, all that is specified is a 
percentage, like an equity investment with a set dividend rate, and the market takes the 
risk that the total amount ultimately paid will be less than expected, and the market also 
gets the benefit if expectations are exceeded.37
Note that one feature of my proposal – the idea that we attack the funding problem on 
a cohort-wide rather than on an individual basis – makes the program I have in mind 
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slightly more similar to what is called a ‘risk-pooling’ ICL than the more common ‘risk-
sharing’ ICL. But this is where the similarity ends. Under risk pooling, each member of 
the debtor cohort is responsible for the total loan made to the cohort, and therefore pay-
ments can go up and seemingly continue on forever if necessary to make up for other 
students’ defaults (see generally Rey and Racionero, 2013). The only risk-pooling ICL 
ever to be tried, however, was the risk-pooling ICL plan designed by James Tobin and 
offered as a financing option to Yale students from about 1971 to 1978, and this program 
was widely regarded as a failure (Ladine, 2001; Nerlove, 1975). Because it was merely 
a financing option, students who saw themselves as heading for high incomes simply 
selected other financing options, thereby leaving the remaining cohort below-average-
income heavy. Moreover, students had the option to buy themselves out of the plan in 
later years by paying 150% of what they still owed, which wealthier students mostly did, 
leaving the remaining cohort even more below-average-income heavy. Finally, the plan 
was very complex and therefore difficult to understand, a feature that by itself no doubt 
discouraged some students from joining it. The obligations of those joining were also 
uncertain and therefore off-putting in a way the obligations to be assumed under my 
program are not. While the percentage of income due was fixed under the Yale program, 
the number of years that students would have to pay was not – this depended on how 
many defaults there were and the corresponding extent of losses the remaining members 
of the cohort would have to make up (West, 1976). Although 35 years was the outside 
maximum specified for the number of years of repayment, it eventually became apparent 
that, in practice, this would turn out to be the minimum too, and Yale had to ultimately 
cancel the remaining debt of each cohort to avoid forcing non-defaulting poor students 
to continue paying for the full 35 years, most wealthier students having earlier bought 
themselves out (The New York Times, 1999).
Under my plan, in contrast, students who expected to earn higher-than-average 
incomes would not be allowed to opt out, and therefore the direct adverse selection prob-
lem would be eliminated. Of course, students under my plan could still choose to go to 
private institutions and borrow funds to pay up front, but this is a far less attractive option 
than it was for students who opted out of the Yale plan. Alternative private institutions 
are likely going to be more expensive, so the amount borrowed if the student elects to go 
this route is likely to exceed and perhaps even greatly exceed the real (i.e. inflation-
adjusted) amount an average income-earning student would eventually pay under my 
plan. Remember also that under my plan the amount each student is to pay (in terms of 
the rate and the number of years) is fixed up front, one cannot buy oneself out, nobody is 
forced to bail anybody else out, and the amounts paid are not framed as loan repayments 
so students have no reason to compare some initial amount borrowed to what they even-
tually pay as a way of evaluating the fairness of the program.38 Most importantly, even 
students who expect to earn more than the average cannot be sure they will earn more, so 
their natural loss aversion should combine to make even indirect adverse selection in 
favor of private universities minimal. (Loss aversion is the tendency of most people to 
give twice the decision weight to avoiding fixed losses, which is what they would incur 
by taking out a loan because they would then have to repay the specified amount, than 
they assign to obtaining contingent gains, which is what they do if they merely agree to 
give up a small percentage of their future income.)39
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In any event, the supposed threat of adverse selection here seems greatly exaggerated. 
Do we really think that a significant percentage of students who today choose to attend 
public rather than private universities because the current fees are cheaper would instead 
switch to private universities when the current up-front fees charged by public universi-
ties are eliminated altogether? Even if my program would make private universities 
somewhat cheaper if you added everything up at the end of 35 years and adjusted for 
inflation (and no student could be certain of this in advance), a student would have to 
have both a remarkable amount of confidence in his or her own income-earning capacity 
and a surprising ability to avoid future discounting in his or her current decision-making 
in order to find going to a private university and paying up front more attractive.40 Given 
that very few mature adults, much less teenagers, are inclined to think like this, signifi-
cant losses through adverse selection seem unlikely.
The final ICL-type proposal I want to mention is one that was released just weeks 
before this article was accepted for publication. This proposal, issued by the Hamilton 
Project, bears some similarities to mine but has important differences as well (see 
Dynarski and Kreisman, 2013). Like all ICL proposals, it limits the amount of each loan 
payment to a percentage of the student borrower’s income – in this case, between 3% and 
10%, depending on the amount of income earned. Although the proposal recognizes that 
one problem with debt repayment is that it begins too soon, when students are still strug-
gling to get on their financial feet, it merely reduces the payments due during this period; 
it does not eliminate them. Payments would continue until the loan is paid in full, with 
interest, or for 25 years, whichever is longer.41 At that point, any remaining balance 
would be written off and paid by the taxpayer. As in my proposal, payments would be 
processed and enforced via the tax system and deducted from earnings like social secu-
rity and withholding tax. Those who could not afford to keep making their payments 
despite the payment cap would be allowed to discharge their loans in bankruptcy much 
more easily than they can do so now; but again, it is the taxpayers who would ultimately 
be making up the difference.
While I view this proposal as probably the best of the ICL proposals out there, I still 
have some serious misgivings. First, as the authors note, the total amount of student debt 
being taken out today is reaching alarming proportions, but their proposal would do 
nothing to deal with this. Indeed, the authors actually deny we have a debt problem; they 
claim all we have is a repayment problem. What the authors mean by this is that 98% of 
students currently borrow US$50,000 or less, an amount they see as currently manage-
able. But US$50,000 seems like a lot to me, especially if a student then wants to go on to 
graduate school, and in any case, I don’t see how this makes the total level of student 
indebtedness in our economy unproblematic in the macro sense. Moreover, the authors 
concede that tuition fees and therefore the amount of indebtedness each student will be 
required to incur is rising rapidly, so even if the current level of indebtedness for most 
students is as unproblematic as the authors think it is on a micro level, more and more 
people will be incurring higher and higher levels of indebtedness and therefore moving 
out of the manageable category. While the Hamilton Project proposal might bring some 
relief for some current student debtors, it is going to provide less and less relief for the 
student debtors of the future. And while some effort is made to give heavy borrowers 
some relief too, this is mostly through the bankruptcy laws, which hardly seems 
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satisfactory. Do we really think that telling a student, ‘Hey, go to college – you can 
always file for bankruptcy later’, is the way to open higher education to everybody? At 
best then, this latest ICL proposal is really more of a short-term relief act for some and 
not a long-term solution to the problem of financing public higher education for 
everyone.
Second, many students now simply cannot afford to take out loans and therefore do 
not even apply to college, and nothing in the Hamilton Project proposal suggests that the 
modest relief it will provide will be enough to give these students a realistic opportunity 
at higher education. The proposal also does nothing to help parents who borrow or oth-
erwise impoverish themselves in order to pay for their children’s education; relief is only 
available for students who take out loans themselves. And it still treats public higher 
education as a largely individual endeavor, with each student responsible for the costs of 
his or her own personal education; no real effort is made to make those who financially 
benefit more from their education subsidize those who financially benefit less, even 
though everybody benefits from living in a community with diverse interests and abili-
ties. Perhaps some might see this is an advantage of their proposal, but in light of the 
enormous amount of inequality now present in the United States and indeed present and 
growing throughout the world I would disagree. And most importantly, like all ICL pro-
posals, this proposal does not provide a mechanism for private capital to be used to 
finance education; it still relies primarily on the public purse. So while I do think this ICL 
proposal is an improvement on previous versions of ICLs, it does not really demonstrate 
a rethinking of the problem.
The other major group of proposals that bears some resemblance to the proposal I am 
making here rejects the idea of funding education through contemporaneous loans and 
replaces this source of funding with some sort of flat or perhaps even a progressive 
‘Graduate Tax’ or ‘GT’ for university graduates on top of the regular income tax. Under 
these proposals (never really under serious consideration in the United States but popular 
in Europe), education would be free at the point of entry to those enrolling in public 
institutions, as it would be under my proposal, and those graduates who earn more would 
pay more; but in most cases, the funds would go into the general fund rather than being 
earmarked for higher education exclusively, much less earmarked for any particular 
institution. Strictly speaking, there would be few or no defaults under this system, 
because people can be generally expected to pay their taxes (that would be similar to my 
proposal), but funding for public higher education would be handled centrally, and dis-
tribution and disbursement would therefore be subject to the normal political pressures 
that apply to the use of all public funds. Education funding would remain a part of the 
public budget, and usually a very big part, and would therefore be subject to all the usual 
complaints about the level of taxation and the need for debt reduction. The budgets of the 
public institutions themselves would also remain liable to the ebb and flow of tax reve-
nues according to fluctuations in the business cycle (see, for example, Glennerster et al., 
1968, 2003; Lincoln and Walker, 1993).42
In contrast, under my proposal, the government gets largely out of the business of 
funding education. The amounts needed to finance education are, as under the GT, 
expressed as a percentage of earnings, but those do not go into a giant pool to be redis-
tributed to the various institutions involved according to some formula to be determined 
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later. Instead, they go to the actual institution that provided the education to that indi-
vidual, and percentages would vary to some degree according to the institution attended. 
People who did not attend one of these public institutions would not have to pay for those 
that did. So under this program, while it is true that wealthier students subsidize poorer 
ones, both groups are part of a single community and therefore should feel less aggrieved 
by having to pay differing absolute amounts. Since the amount paid bears a strong rela-
tion to the amount of benefit received, the apparently irrepressible aversion of all citizens 
to paying funds into what they see as a giant government financial black hole would not 
apply. The rich pay more but more painlessly than under the GT, and the problem of 
redistribution of these funds and the central planning that entails is eliminated. Yet gov-
ernment is not completely out of the business of supporting institutions of higher educa-
tion. To the extent these institutions produce public goods, funding for this would still 
come out of general taxation, as it should. But with regard to actual higher education 
services, government support switches from providing funding to providing enforcement 
services to be sure everyone pays whatever amounts are due and administrative services 
to process the payments made. Defaults (or rather failures to pay as agreed) should be 
miniscule, and so no one need be concerned that they are paying for free riders. And all 
these factors taken together, in my view, make my proposal superior to either ICL or GT 
programs.
So let us now focus on how we would arrive at the actual amounts each student would 
promise to pay under my proposal. To do this, we need to know the average total cost per 
year per student at a particular public university or group of universities. Remember, the 
law of large numbers will be doing a lot of work here – it allows us not to worry about 
the future earnings of any particular individual but only the current average earnings of 
the existing graduates for the relevant university or university system as a whole, a num-
ber that is readily determinable. This avoids all the problems that might otherwise apply 
to taking an equity interest in the human capital of a particular individual (see, for exam-
ple, Lattman and Eder, 2013). We accordingly want each issue of the relevant securities 
to cover a reasonably large number of students.43 But we also need to be sure that the cost 
of education provided and the average earnings of the students in this group are roughly 
equivalent across the linked institutions so that no one institution is taking advantage of 
the lower costs or better average income figures earned by the graduates of another. 
California, for example, has a three-tier public higher education system: the University 
of California system, which has a total of 10 semi-autonomous campuses; the California 
State University system, which has 23; and the Community College system, which has 
over 100. The cost and quality of the education provided and the future income-earning 
power of the graduates of these systems vary dramatically, so we would not want to lump 
all the students in all three systems together. On the other hand, we need not focus on a 
single campus within each system – although there are differences in cost and in pro-
jected student earnings among the campuses, these differences are relatively modest, and 
while each campus is semi-autonomous, they can still respond to incentives as a whole, 
for a great deal of budgeting and educational policy is set system-wide. Again, we want 
to use the power of the law of large numbers, and we also want the efficiencies that come 
from having to design a smaller number of very inclusive investment vehicles rather than 
a larger number of more individually tailored ones, so we want to focus on the largest 
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group of similarly situated students as possible. So while we could focus on a single 
campus, and in some states the variation between campuses might be such that we would 
want to do this,44 in California it should be possible to focus on each system as a whole. 
From here on, therefore, I will focus on the University of California system in illustrating 
how the details of my proposal would be cashed out.
The average total cost of educating a student in the University of California system is 
currently about US$20,000 a year.45 The first question to ask, then, is whether average 
total cost is what we want to know. We could, for example, use marginal cost – the cost 
of educating one more student – as the relevant figure. If we decide that the government 
or private donors should cover the provision, replenishment, and upgrade of fixed costs 
like plant (i.e. new buildings) and equipment and the payment of interest on existing and 
future anticipated university debt, then using marginal cost is indeed what we should do. 
But I am going to assume that we want to shift as much of the burden of the cost of pro-
viding public higher education as possible away from taxpayers and, therefore, the figure 
we want is average total costs, which allocates a share of fixed costs to each student.46 If 
we decide that taxpayers or private donors rather than students should be the source of 
funds to cover some fixed costs, this would mean that the figures I am about to use would 
need to be recalculated. But if securities can be constructed that are attractive to both 
students and investors using the higher figure of average total costs, then my proposal 
has even more power, so that is the approach I shall follow here.
Now we could design our securities so that they covered only 1 year at a time, in 
which case we would begin our calculation of how our securities should be structured 
with this US$20,000 figure. But it seems unwieldy to have do a securities offering for 
each class every year – it would be much more convenient to do an offering for each class 
that covers the cost of their education for 4 years, given that an undergraduate education 
theoretically takes 4 years to complete. In this case, our base figure would not be the cur-
rent average total cost for 1 year, but the current expected average total cost for 4 years, 
or US$80,000 plus some amount to cover the expected rate of inflation over the relevant 
4-year period. If we assume a 2% rate of inflation per year, which is currently the target 
rate aimed at by the Federal Reserve and most other Central Banks around the world 
(see, for example, Federal Open Market Committee, 2012), this would mean the total 
base figure per student would be US$82,432.47 Of course, there are many variations in 
this ‘straight-through-in-four-years’ model – some students drop out or take longer than 
4 years to complete their degree or skip years for various reasons, some students will 
transfer in only in their junior year, and so on. But these complications can be dealt with 
by the law of large numbers. For given the size of each student cohort, we should be able 
to predict these fluctuations with a great deal of accuracy. We simply account for these 
expected fluctuations actuarially and design our securities so that we come up with a 
figure that represents the average total cost of educating each incoming class (taking 
account of the usual delays and transfers in and transfers out) to graduation. Students 
who drop out get their promise to pay proportionally reduced, and students who transfer 
in make only a proportional promise to pay, so some of these adjustments would actually 
cancel each other out.
So let us assume here for simplicity’s sake that we expect the number and timing of 
drop outs to at least roughly match the number and timing of transfers in. Any errors in 
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these calculations would be absorbed by the equity tranche anyway, but if we feel uncom-
fortable about this, we can always go back to issuing these securities on a yearly basis. 
In any event, assuming we do issue these securities by cohort rather than by year, this 
means that the University of California system would need to raise US$82,432 times the 
number of students admitted to each cohort to cover the current average total cost of 
providing them the promised undergraduate education. How can we construct a security 
that can be sold today in the marketplace for this amount?
If these were loans in which people were buying a share, as they would be if each 
student had promised to repay a set amount, then at the very least the principal amount 
of the loan would have to be subject to interest to cover not only the time value of money 
but also the expected rate of inflation until all of the principal and accumulated interest 
would be repaid. But remember, this is not the kind of promise that is being made here. 
Rather than promising to pay a set amount at some future date plus interest to cover the 
effect of inflation and the opportunity cost of the capital involved, the promises at issue 
here are to pay a set percentage of each individual’s AGI. Because average income rises 
with inflation, no separate amount of interest need be included to cover inflation. The 
index from which the amount of payment is calculated already has compensation for 
inflation built into it. Whether payment begins in 1 year or 20, the amount paid should 
roughly equal the inflation-adjusted value of the original US$82,432 on an average basis. 
There could be some degree of departure from this, of course, one way or the other, for 
it is possible that average income will either outpace or fall behind the rate of inflation. 
But this is simply one of the risks the investor takes. In any case, the chances of a mis-
match here are small – since 1913, average income has generally increased more than the 
rate of inflation (see Piketty and Saez, 2006; Saez, 2009, 2012).48 Indeed, considering 
that the return on principal will be paid out over a 20-year period after a 15-year delay, 
these is no period within the last 100 years when the amount ultimately received by an 
investor would have failed to cover the initial inflation-adjusted price of a similarly 
designed security.49 There is also lots of evidence suggesting that higher levels of educa-
tion within a state lead to greater productivity and higher average wages within that state, 
which in turn suggests that implementation of my proposal would lead average wages to 
rise faster than inflation even more than they have in the past (see Berger and Fisher, 
2013). So even if we assume investor loss aversion, the upside here sufficiently out-
weighs the downside that this particular risk should not be a major factor in the invest-
ment decision (see Levy, 2012: 316–323).
But this just means that people who bought a US$82,432 interest in our securities 
would get the current inflation-adjusted value of this amount back no matter when pay-
ments start coming in. That might be enough in today’s market, for investors are willing 
to accept negative real rates of return for very safe investments. Indeed, Treasury Inflation 
Protected Securities, or TIPS, are currently offering negative rates of return, and the 
government has no trouble selling them. Because the upper tranches of our securities 
would also be very safe, it is probable that no further adjustment to this amount would be 
necessary for our securities to sell at auction for their face amount. But let us assume we 
want to be sure about this, and therefore want to make our securities even more attrac-
tive, so we want investors to be pretty certain they will enjoy the equivalent of a real rate 
of return, that is, an amount that exceeds the actual amount of inflation. Indeed, let us say 
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we want to offer a real rate of return of 3%. This is a very good rate of return; few invest-
ments offer this kind of return on a near-guaranteed basis, especially under current finan-
cial conditions. My sense is that 3% is probably unnecessarily high, and that the securities 
would probably sell well at auction even if they provided for a lesser return, but we can 
always adjust this number up or down in future offerings after we have some experience 
on how the market reacts to this amount.50 So I will use the 3% figure here because that 
should be ample and once again, if less will do, then that will simply make my proposal 
that much more powerful.
So this means that the total return on this security should be US$82,432 in current 
dollars plus 3% of the outstanding balance over the number of years it takes before that 
US$82,432 is paid in full once payments begin. In other words, this is like taking a loan 
for US$82,432 today and then paying it back at 3% interest for 20 years.51 If we did that, 
the total amount paid would be US$109,718, and the payments would be US$457.16 per 
month, or US$5,486 per year, or about what it costs to finance a nicely appointed new 
car. But the amount to be repaid is not being figured as a dollar amount – rather, it is 
being figured as a percentage of income. If the current average income of someone with 
an undergraduate degree from the relevant institution in their prime earning years is 
approximately US$90,000, as it is at our example, the University of California,52 this 
means that someone with that income would today have to pay 6% of their AGI each year 
for over 20 years to make that payment.53 Now, of course, we have no idea what the aver-
age income of our graduates will be in 15 years when the payments are set to start, but 
this does not matter. Whatever it will be, it should have the same inflation-adjusted value 
as those payments would have today because we are not fixing the amount of the pay-
ment, only the percentage of income that the payment represents. So it does not matter 
how many years go by before the repayment begins. As long as the repayment is 
expressed at a percentage of average income, it is inflation protected. (Interest is usually 
added to cover inflation, but this is only necessary when the principal is a set amount – 
when it is a percentage of something that itself raises and falls with the rate of inflation 
this amount is unnecessary.) The set return (the 3%) we added in before is what covers 
the real rate of return on the original principal amount. Since we are packaging all these 
promises together and then slicing them up, we can be pretty confident that the average 
numbers will indeed represent what gets paid.
But how do we account for the rate of default? Since investors get paid first, and col-
lection and enforcement is handled by the IRS, there should be a very low rate of default, 
and thus we need not add very much in to cover this. Besides, any failures to pay would 
be fully absorbed by the equity tranche, because that is the way this kind of securitization 
works, thus leaving the holders of more senior slices unaffected, and purchasers of secu-
rities in the equity tranche get compensated for taking this risk by paying a lower price 
or getting a slightly higher rate of return. If we want, we can even liquidate the risk of 
nonpayment for holders of securities in the equity tranche by purchasing insurance and 
adding the cost of this insurance to the overall price of the securities. In any event, given 
these safeguards, the securities in the upper tranches should be rated AAA, and those in 
the equity tranche should be rated very close to this even without insurance. They should 
accordingly be very attractive to investors, and they should indeed sell for at least 
US$82,432 a promise at auction at the time they are offered, because what the investor 
20 Theory and Research in Education XX(X)
is buying is the right to receive that amount back plus an estimated 3% real rate of return 
over 20 years starting in 15 years.54 Since the securities do not represent an interest in a 
single promise to pay but a slice of all promises, we can slice them up into thinner units 
so each individual security may be offered for, say, US$100 a share – all that matters is 
that however thin we slice these promises, they end up totaling US$82,432 a promise 
times the number of students in each cohort. The offering price of these securities would 
then be that effective price of US$82,432 a promise, plus whatever marketing, collec-
tion, and administrative costs we expected to incur, although some of these could be 
borne by the government as its contribution to the success of the offering.
Like T-bills and other Treasury-sponsored securities, these educational securities 
would be sold at auction, with the reserve price (the minimum price one has to pay to get 
one) set at the face amount of each share, figured as the relevant portion of each 
US$82,432 promise, the relevant portion depending on how thinly each of the promises 
was sliced up. Shares in the senior tranche would obviously be the most attractive, and 
therefore attract the highest bids; shares in the lower tranches would attract somewhat 
lower bids. Because the equity tranche is the only tranche that really bears any risk, how-
ever, and even this risk is slight, the securities in that tranche might be the only ones that 
have to be priced lower. In any event, in order to maximize the amount bid for each 
security and to ensure that people actually bid the maximum they were willing to pay, the 
auction would be conducted on a second-price sealed bid basis. That is, each bidder 
would not know the bids of anyone else, the securities would be allocated to the highest 
bidders, but the highest bidders would not pay what they bid, they would pay what the 
next highest bidder bid. This ensures that people do not bid strategically and offer less 
than they are willing to pay because they think this is all that will be required to get the 
number of shares in which they are interested (see Binmore, 2007: 596). And while this 
method of bidding is not essential, it does ensure that the offering university or university 
system raises the maximum it can on each offering and that we get an accurate idea of 
what people actually think these securities are worth.55
Once the initial offering is over, the price of the securities would fluctuate in the after-
market depending on whether the percentage of average income figure looks high or low 
when compared to inflation, but it would eventually stabilize as we get closer to the pay-
ment dates and our uncertainty about this gets reduced. (In this sense, the price of these 
securities would fluctuate as it does for options.) So the price of these securities might go 
down or up. They will go up, for example, if graduates from that particular university or 
group of universities start to increase their average wage relative to inflation. Universities 
accordingly have an incentive to produce graduates whose average incomes rise faster 
than inflation, for this makes their securities more attractive. If the university’s graduates 
start doing worse on an inflation-adjusted basis, the value of the securities would go 
down. But these are risks the investors would bear, not the university, for the university 
has already received all the money it needs to educate each cohort at the time of the ini-
tial offering. The university would only bear the risk of its students’ average income 
lagging behind inflation in the sense that, if this happens, they will have to raise the 
amount of real interest they add into the price of their new offerings, and these securities 
would therefore become more expensive. The securities could, however, include an 
equity kicker, that is, to the extent that the amount repaid exceeds, say, a 6% real rate of 
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return (or twice the amount projected), the overage is split between the offering institu-
tion and its investors. This way, if the securities turn out to be substantially more profit-
able than the market expected – that is, to the extent that these investments generate 
alpha returns – both the originating university and the current holders of these securities 
would benefit.
Note that if this proposal for financing were adopted, one important feature of it 
would be that no one (i.e. no incoming domestic student) could be allowed to opt out. 
Because the whole point is to have those who do financially well in later life subsidize 
the cost of those who do poorly, we can’t allow those who intend to enter high-income 
professions to finance their educations in some other manner. We also don’t want to 
diminish the potential upside on this investment – the profit that it generates if increases 
in average income exceed increases in inflation – because this is one of the things that 
make this investment attractive, and to make this average income figure meaningful, it 
must include everybody. But this is as it should be, because there is nothing unfair in 
making everyone pay an equal percentage. (In this way, these promises to pay are like a 
flat tax.) Parents who had sufficient resources to pay for their children’s education up 
front, however, and wanted to relieve their children of the burden of this future obliga-
tion to pay could still do so. To do this, they would simply buy the equivalent of one 
promise in their university’s current offering and give this security to their child. The 
child can then use the income from this security to make her own payments when 
the time comes. If the student earned the average income when the time for payment 
came due, her payments out would exactly match the income she receives on the secu-
rity her parents gave her. If she earns less than the average, she profits. If she earns 
more, she ends up having to pay something out of her own pocket, but again, for most 
people, this amount would be relatively modest.56 Only a few individuals would have to 
pay substantially more.
To ensure that highly compensated individuals do not use deferred income or other 
accounting tricks to avoid paying the full 6% on their earnings, that 6% would apply to 
income when earned regardless of when it was received (in other words, contributions to 
retirement plans that are otherwise deductable from AGI would have to be added back in 
for purposes of calculating the amount due). The 6% figure would also apply to any other 
form of deferred income as long as the origin of that income could be traced in any part 
to work done during the relevant period covered by the security. Again, since any attempt 
to hide income here would also subject the individual to tax penalties and potentially 
even prosecution for tax evasion, the number of people who go to such lengths to try to 
avoid their obligation to make payments is likely to be a small percentage of this small 
percentage, or hardly enough people to worry about at all. (The payments that these peo-
ple were supposed to make but did not would come out of the equity tranche anyway.) 
Adjustments would also have to be made on joint returns – the 6% provision would only 
apply to individual adjusted joint income to ensure that everyone’s payment was calcu-
lated based on the income they personally received, for this is what is tied to the educa-
tion they received, at least in part, and not to the joint income of the individual and his or 
her partner. There might also be some other adjustments required before the 6% figure 
could be applied – any income excluded from AGI under the foreign income exclusion 
would have to be added back in, for example, as this would also be the product of one’s 
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education.57 But most other adjustments to income could still stand, so the extra calcula-
tions required here should be few and relatively easy to make.
The receipt of payments on these education securities would also be subject to special 
tax rules in order to ensure they were no less attractive than a loan of money. To the 
extent each payment received represented the return of inflation-adjusted capital, its 
receipt would be tax free, just as if it were loan payment. Only that portion of each pay-
ment that represents the receipt of real interest would be taxable. If the government 
wanted to make these securities even more attractive, it could make even this portion of 
each payment tax free. This would cost the government something in terms of lost rev-
enue, so it might not want to do this, but if not, this would not by any means be fatal. 
Even if just the return of inflation-adjusted capital is tax free, this puts the investors in 
these securities in the same position as lenders, so the government would not actually be 
giving up any tax revenue it would otherwise be receiving if public higher education 
continued to be funded by government grants and loans and loan guarantees. Payments 
on these securities could also be tax deductable, at least up to a point, as they would be 
if they represented the payment of current direct educational expenses.58 And there are 
various other actions the government could take here to ensure that the investment in and 
repayment of these securities received favorable tax treatment if it were so inclined, 
thereby making the securities even more attractive and thereby reducing even further the 
amount of real interest the securities would have to offer. In any event, even if all these 
favorable policies were adopted, the cost to the government would still be far less that the 
government incurs now as a maker of grants and a guarantor of student loans with a high 
rate of default.
Another way in which the government could support the issuance of these securities 
without putting money out is by protecting the issuers and their lawyers, brokers, 
accountants, and underwriters from civil liability to purchasers if anything goes wrong. 
Securities litigation is hugely expensive, as is the purchase of insurance to cover civil 
securities and associated tort liability, so if such expenses were unnecessary, that would 
help keep the price of these securities and the corresponding promise to pay that students 
would have to make as low as possible. Criminal liability, including liability for criminal 
fines and penalties imposed by public agencies, would of course remain, and the govern-
ment would have to credibly commit itself to enforce the securities laws vigorously 
regarding the issuance of these securities. But if it were to do so, the threat of such 
enforcement action should be enough to deter wrongdoing and reassure investors as 
much as the threat of civil liability for damages. All offerings would have to be approved 
by the relevant government agencies before they were made, and even vigorous over-
sight of these offerings would cost less than government’s current commitment to the 
financial support of public higher education. In other words, rather than contributing 
money, the government would support public higher education by lending its enforce-
ment structure to remove the risk of nonpayment and the cost of insuring against private 
civil liability. And as long as the government carried through on its commitment to strict 
supervision and enforcement, this should be more than sufficient to reassure the market 
and make these securities as attractive as any other investment, perhaps even more so.59 
Those potential investors who were so risk averse they would be troubled by this would 
simply have to take their more limited enforcement options into account in deciding 
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whether they really wanted to invest in such securities. But if this should prove problem-
atic, all it would mean is that this risk would have to be covered by insurance and the cost 
of this insurance added to the baseline amount to be raised, and the price of the securities 
recalculated accordingly.
Finally, note that I have not included living expenses in the 6% figure. Help with these 
expenses for those who required it would accordingly need to be provided to students in 
some other manner, perhaps by providing government- or university-subsidized housing 
and meal plans for those unable to pay market rates for such basics themselves and 
whose parents could not support them. If these expenses were added in and the terms of 
the securities recalculated, this would cause the percentage of AGI to be paid over to 
increase to around 10%. While this in my view is still a workable figure, it nevertheless 
seems best to leave these expenses out. First, because it seems economically more effi-
cient not to engage in the long-term deferral of student payment of these costs, but rather 
finance them through more short-term methods if they must be financed at all. Second, 
because these costs are highly variable depending on the lifestyle each particular student 
chooses to pursue, and so averaging these out merely ensures that some students will 
receive more than they need or would choose to spend on themselves and some will 
receive less. And third, because it is always best in my view to ensure that endeavors that 
require commitment from those who undertake them require some up-front sacrifice, for 
otherwise people are likely to stop taking their commitment to succeed at these endeav-
ors seriously. If obtaining an education is completely sacrifice free, we are likely to 
attract the wrong kind of students to our universities and have to spend a great deal of 
time weeding out those who are only there because they would prefer not to work, for 
they would otherwise be both a financial and educational drag on those who were there 
for more appropriate reasons. What we want is students who are there because they genu-
inely hope to broaden their horizons and make something of themselves, and are there-
fore willing to incur costs and exert effort now in order to increase the opportunities open 
to them later on.  This, of course, includes those who may have already had careers but 
now find themselves unemployed and want to retrain, for making further education 
available to those unable to find work is an important way of attacking our continuing 
unemployment problem.60 In any case, for those that need assistance with housing and 
living expenses too, we can make provision for this in some other fashion; the major 
hurdle to entering into higher education having already been removed under the terms of 
my proposal.61
Answering some objections
While I cannot anticipate every possible objection to my proposal, there are a few con-
cerns, both ideological and practical, macro and micro, that I can anticipate. In this sec-
tion, I will accordingly do my best to address them. One is that regardless of whether 
preventing opt-outs is necessary for my proposal to work, this is an infringement of 
negative liberty, and therefore is objectionable because it is a violation of the rights of 
those who prefer to finance their education in some other way. I have several responses 
to this objection. One is that if a student does not want to use a share of his future AGI to 
pay for his education, he does not have to, for he or she can always go to a private 
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university and pay for his education in some other manner. In other words, the no opt-out 
provision does not prevent those students who feel that encumbering their future income 
in this way would be an unacceptable infringement of their liberty from getting an educa-
tion; it merely prevents those students from getting an education at a public institution of 
higher learning. Surely, no one has a right to a public education that is paid for up front. If 
a student feels that strongly about keeping his future income unencumbered, there should 
be plenty of quality private institutions out there willing to oblige and take his money on 
a pay-as-you-go basis. And while the nominal amount paid in the future may greatly 
exceed the amount charged on a pay-as-you-go basis, the real (i.e. inflation-adjusted) 
amount should be roughly the same. While some students will, of course, pay more than 
the average, this is simply compensation for the risk that they might pay less, and I can see 
no reason why it should be considered an infringement of liberty to require those creating 
this risk to pay for it, at least as long as the method of payment offers compensating ben-
efits. And in this case, it clearly does, for students pay nothing up front and eventually pay 
less if they earn less than the average. Insisting that no student be required to transfer a 
share of his future income no matter what kind of institution he wants to attend when there 
are a variety of choices available is simply to fetishize consent in a way that is not defen-
sible under any plausible conception of liberty. So this objection fails.
There is a more extreme version of this objection, however, that I suppose I must also 
address. And this is that even if an agreement to enter into this kind of financing arrange-
ment is truly voluntary, it is still tantamount to slavery, and slavery is considered morally 
objectionable by most people even if it is entered into voluntarily. Of course, at least 
some and perhaps all of the moral force of this objection comes from what seem to be 
irrepressible doubts that one could rationally submit to slavery voluntarily and, therefore 
the objection is not as independent of the prior one as it might seem. And these doubts 
may indeed be valid when we think of slavery as transferring the entire package of rights 
and obligations that constitute self-ownership to another. But this is hardly what is going 
on here. One is technically selling a small and temporary interest in one’s earning capacity 
to another, but not entering into an obligation to earn anything, and this is substantively 
even less of an infringement of self-ownership than when one enters into a long-term loan, 
a long-term requirements contract, or a long-term employment agreement. Besides, the 
kind of agreement my proposal contemplates is nothing new – it is the common method 
by which agents get paid, and no one seems to think there is something alarming about 
that. (Lots of people complain about their agents, of course, and some even accuse them 
of being parasitic, but I do not think that anyone truly considers the method of calculating 
payment here a form of slavery.) The slavery objection is therefore overblown, fueled by 
emotion rather than reason. Even Milton Friedman, who considered himself and was con-
sidered by many to be a champion of freedom, dismissed this objection as ‘irrational’ 
(Friedman, 1955: 102–104). So this version of the objection also fails.
The next potential objection that I want to address focuses on the possibility that my 
proposal might provide incentives to covered academic institutions to eliminate depart-
ments, especially in the arts and humanities, something that many academic institutions 
are already feeling pressure to do and something that most educational professionals 
think is undesirable (see, for example, Hunter and Mohammed, 2013; Lewin, 2013; 
Schrag, 2012; Stewart, 2013). This is possible because the income-generating potential 
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of the various undergraduate majors currently on offer differs widely – one recent US 
study, for example, claims that median incomes range from about US$29,000 per annum 
for psychology majors without advanced degrees to US$120,000 per annum for petro-
leum engineers (Carnevale et al., 2013: 9, 24).62 The top 10 undergraduate majors with 
regard to earning potential all involve engineering or applied math, while the bottom 10 
are all in the humanities and the arts (Carnevale et al., 2013: 27). In order to make their 
securities more attractive to investors, universities that participate in my financing 
scheme might accordingly be tempted to eliminate departments that do not produce high-
income earners, or at least those departments that consistently produce low-income earn-
ers, in order to make their securities more attractive to investors.63
But this concern actually arises out of a misunderstanding of what makes the educa-
tion securities that my proposal contemplates attractive as investments. The greater the 
average income of the cohort, the smaller the percentage of income each member of 
the cohort must promise to pay to cover the average total costs of their education. But the 
lower the average total costs of the education services provided, the smaller the percent-
age of income each member of the cohort must promise to pay as well, and sciences and 
engineering have much larger fixed cost than the humanities (the English Department, 
after all, does not need a cyclotron or other kinds of very expensive buildings and equip-
ment). More importantly, however, what matters to investors is not average cohort earn-
ings or average total costs per student but the relation between average cohort earnings 
and inflation. Thus, the education securities of a university that offers degrees only in 
engineering is no more attractive to investors than a more well-rounded university offer-
ing education to students in all sorts of majors, even though the average income of its 
student cohort may be higher, because in this case, the percentage of income that each 
student must promise to pay would be correspondingly smaller. What matters to inves-
tors is the size of the cohort (it has to be big enough for the law of large numbers to be 
firmly in control), how diversified the cohort is (for a diverse cohort is subject only to 
market risk, while a specialized one is subject to unique risk, and that actually makes the 
investment less attractive), how carefully the costing and percentage figures have been 
calculated, and how consistent the institution has been in producing cohorts whose aver-
age salaries meet or exceed inflation. Moreover, it is important to remember that inequal-
ity is now at historic highs not seen for 90 years (Reiff, 2013). It is accordingly much 
more likely that the spread between the income-generating potential of different occupa-
tions will be narrower in the near to mid-future and not wider, and that lower-than-
average incomes will outpace inflation at an even higher rate than above-average 
incomes. So my proposal does not, in fact, give institutions incentives to eliminate 
departments that offer less lucrative majors in order to make its securities more market-
able. Universities might have incentives to do this for other reasons, of course, and I 
agree that this is undesirable, but whether it is and what to do about it is a debate for 
another article. All we need note now is that the method of financing I have proposed is 
at worst neutral with regard to this debate. The most likely effect of my proposal is to 
encourage public universities to continue providing education services in a diversity of 
fields, not to encourage them to narrow the current choices they have on offer.
Another possible objection to my proposal is that this method of financing public 
higher education might create psychological impediments to charitable giving. Many 
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universities depend heavily on income from their endowments to finance current opera-
tions, and those endowments are created primarily through gifts from alumnae. If alum-
nae were already paying 6% of their AGI to their university (or to the investors who 
bought their promise to their university) they might be less inclined to engage in charita-
ble giving. And indeed, there is some evidence that increases in state funding do reduce 
charitable giving to public institutions (see, for example, Leslie and Ramey, 1988: esp. 
120, 127). But under my proposal, state support would actually decrease.64 Although 
assured private support would increase, and therefore formerly ‘public’ institutions 
would have more funds, there is no evidence that a university’s overall wealth or income 
affects charitable giving. Harvard, for instance, which has by far the largest endowment 
in the world, still has no trouble raising money from its alumnae. Nevertheless, I suppose 
it is plausible to think that charitable giving from alumnae might be somewhat reduced 
were my proposal implemented. But prestige is also a major factor driving charitable 
giving, and nothing in my proposal would change that. Wealthy alumnae would therefore 
still have an incentive to make large gifts, for they could not achieve the public recogni-
tion such gifts attract simply by making payments on their securities as agreed. More 
importantly, public universities have historically relied far less on their endowments than 
private universities do. It is only recently, when public funding began to be cut, that most 
public universities started developing and relying on their endowments more. Because the 
payments on the securities contemplated by my proposal would cover average total costs, 
however, and this includes a share of fixed costs, this recently heightened reliance on 
charitable giving should no longer be necessary. The amount of fund-raising and associ-
ated administrative infrastructure required to generate such giving is substantial, and these 
costs could now be saved. Finally, it seems highly likely that at some point in the near 
future we will see the federal tax deduction for charitable contributions reduced or even 
eliminated, for this deduction primarily benefits the rich (those making over US$200,000) 
and their favored (mostly private) institutions (the rich have up to 40% of their contribu-
tions subsidized by the government, while the gifts of those with more modest means end 
up not being subsidized at all). So to the extent charitable giving is tax motivated, it is 
likely to become a less reliable and significant source of income in the near future anyway 
(see Bartlett, 2013b; Shiller, 2012). And to the extent it isn’t tax motivated, it seems 
unlikely that changes to the way public higher education is financed will have much of an 
impact on charitable giving at all (see Bartlett, 2013a). I therefore see no reason to believe 
that public universities would ultimately be worse off and every reason to believe they 
will have increasingly secure funding under this method of financing than they could ever 
have, no matter how successful they previously were at fund-raising from their alumnae.
Another possible worry created by my proposal is that this method of financing may 
work well for top public institutions, those whose graduates earn high average incomes, 
but not well for lesser institutions whose graduates earn less. Although everyone who 
gets into one of these top institutions would pay nothing up front, it is true that those who 
are most likely to get in are those who have done best in high school, and since educa-
tional performance is tightly correlated with family income, those students are likely to 
be financially better off than those who get in only to lesser institutions.65 If those who 
can obtain entry only to lesser institutions end up having to promise to pay a greater 
percentage of their future AGI in order to obtain a lesser education than their wealthier 
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high-school classmates because those who go to lesser schools are from families with a 
lower income, the effect of all this is to penalize the poor and increase the obstacles they 
face to economic mobility.
But lesser universities typically have lesser costs too – they have fewer and less expen-
sive facilities, less expensive faculty, and so on, and yet the average income of their gradu-
ates can still be relatively high, so there is no reason to assume that students attending less 
prestigious institutions would actually pay more. And using the California system as our 
example once again, we can see that they actually would not. Average mid-career median 
income for California State University (Cal State) graduates is US$79,000, or not that 
much lower than the average income of University of California (UC) graduates (see 
California State University, 2013b).66 Average total cost per student at Cal State is approx-
imately US$12,526 (see California State University, 2013a). We can even round this up to 
US$15,000 just to be sure everything is covered. In this case, and using the same method 
of calculation used for the University of California cohort, the percentage of AGI each Cal 
State graduate would have to pay during their prime earning years is 5.12% of their AGI, 
which is about 15% less than the percentage University of California graduates would 
have to pay. But the average income for Cal State graduates is only 12% less than those 
who graduate from the University of California, so there does not seem to be any obvious 
unfairness to Cal State graduates there. Students that go to less accomplished state institu-
tions do indeed pay less than students who go to more accomplished institutions. The cost 
of education Community Colleges provide is even cheaper, and part-time attendance eas-
ier (see College Board Advocacy & Policy Center, 2012), so education at these institu-
tions could continue to be financed as it is now. Of course, we would have to run the 
numbers for each state’s institutions, and it is possible that in some states things might 
come out differently, but it does not appear that there would be any significant hidden 
penalty that this method of financing effectively works upon the poor.67
There is another possible ‘fairness’ objection here, however, that I also want to 
address. Almost half of undergraduates in the University of California system currently 
receive state, federal, or university grants so that they pay no tuition at all to attend the 
university. Under my proposal, in contrast, the amount ultimately paid by each student 
will depend on his or her future income and not on the current income of the student’s 
family. Many students who under the current system would be attending the University 
of California for free would under my proposal ultimately have to pay something for 
their education, and some would have to pay a great deal, although the amount will 
depend on their actual eventual income and the payments required would not have to be 
made until quite some time into the future. In other words, my proposal might be Kaldor–
Hicks efficient (meaning the gains for some outweigh the losses to others), but it is not a 
Pareto improvement (meaning that while others gain, some do lose, and the losers might 
be students from poor families, even though they end up earning very high incomes 
themselves). Would this make my proposal unfair to these students or, more generally, 
unfair to the poor?
I think not. Education, unlike many other goods, gains value as it ages, rather than 
loses value. Why should the value of what is received be measured synchronically, that 
is, at one point in time, when it is first received, rather than diachronically, that is, over 
time, as it pays off? Why should a student who comes from a poor family pay nothing for 
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her education when she becomes an investment banker and earns millions, while a stu-
dent from a rich family pays full freight even if she becomes a social worker and ulti-
mately earns only a modest income? Now, I do not mean to suggest that the poor kid has 
exploited the rich kid in this case; I merely mean to suggest that we are perhaps using a 
second-best measure to determine who is poor and who is rich under the current system. 
If an education must be paid for up front, we have little choice but to proceed as we do 
now if we are to make any progress toward ensuring that educational opportunities are 
equally available to everyone. But if we follow my proposal, we can tie the amount paid 
to the actual future wealth of the individual involved. After all, it is the student who is the 
primary (although certainly not the exclusive) beneficiary of the education she receives, 
not her family. Is it not better, then, in the sense of being ‘more fair’, to tie the amount 
each student pays for her education to that student’s future income rather than to the cur-
rent wealth of her family? Is it not better, in the sense of the egalitarian ethos, which 
requires us to treat rich and poor families equally, not to require poor families to have to 
plead poverty in order to obtain an education for their children, when rich families do not 
have to prove they deserve their wealth in order to obtain an education for theirs? And is 
it not even more important to move from the current system to the one that I propose 
when we consider that not everyone receives all the financial grants they need to pursue 
a higher education, and that many have to borrow substantial sums or work long hours 
outside of school or even forego higher education for some time in order to raise money 
first and may perhaps be forced to forego higher education entirely?68 Is this not even 
more of a concern when we consider that while this situation may now be beginning to 
stabilize in California, prior cuts are not likely to be restored and when the next financial 
downturn arrives things are only going to get worse (see Nagourney, 2013)? For every 
student who would ultimately be given a free ride through university under the current 
system, there are no doubt many who will face extreme financial pressure, and the uncer-
tainty this creates is likely to have a chilling effect on the willingness of many students 
to pursue a higher education at all, something which in itself is objectionable. In these 
circumstances, I think the burdens and benefits of public higher education are more fairly 
distributed under my proposal than they are under our current practice.69 While it is true 
that some individuals will in some sense end up worse off under my proposal than they 
would under current practice, these are all individuals who by definition can easily afford 
to and actually should pay more.
Indeed, my proposal is certainly more fair than those proposals that have been floated 
recently to charge more to those majoring in less lucrative subjects, as Florida is cur-
rently proposing to do (see Alvarez, 2012; Weissmann, 2012c). The effect of these pro-
posals is to require the future poor to subsidize the future rich, a form of what Michael 
Harrington piquantly called ‘anti-social socialism’, and there is nothing fair or desirable 
about that. In contrast, my proposal requires the future rich, defined as those who actu-
ally receive higher incomes after trading (at least in part) on their undergraduate educa-
tion, to subsidize the cost of educating the future poor. After all, as I have already noted, 
education is a joint not an individual enterprise; everybody benefits from living in an 
educated society where people have a wide range of skills and interests (in other words, 
having people educated in the humanities and the arts as well as science and engineering 
creates positive externalities – it is a public as well as a private good), and in conducting 
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such a joint enterprise there is nothing unjust about requiring the (financially) stronger 
members to help out the (financially) weaker members. There is no point to the argument 
that your part of our boat is sinking. If the boat is sinking, everybody drowns, and so it 
is in everybody’s interest to keep the boat afloat even though everyone may not be 
equally contributing financially to that effort, assuming this is true. Accordingly, this 
version of the fairness objection to my proposal also fails.
Actually, my proposal not only fails to inflict any element of unfairness, it also helps 
reduce one element of unfairness that results from embedded racial and gender preju-
dices in our economy. Not only is there evidence that incomes currently vary signifi-
cantly by undergraduate major, there is also evidence that incomes vary significantly by 
race and gender (see Carnevale et al., 2013). In other words, the incomes of members of 
racial minorities and women are less and in some cases substantially less than the 
incomes earned by white men with identical educational backgrounds and occupations. 
By requiring white men to pay the same percentage of their income for their education as 
women and minorities, my proposal automatically partially corrects for the unearned 
race and gender benefit that white men currently enjoy. (Of course, we might want to do 
something to correct this injustice more completely and directly, but that is not a job for 
my principle of financing.) If this unearned benefit ever goes away, however, this effect 
of my proposal automatically adjusts, and everyone with the same educational back-
ground and occupation will have the same median income and therefore will pay the 
same.
The final variation on the fairness objection that I want to address is this: those who 
end up earning substantially more than the average income for their cohort will pay 
more, and in some cases substantially more, than what it actually cost to provide them 
with their education. By requiring them to pay more than the inflation-adjusted average 
total cost of their education, are we not in effect exploiting the rich? Although there are 
many different definitions for exploitation floating around, the one I am most concerned 
with here is the one I set forth in my recent book, Exploitation and Economic Justice in 
the Liberal Capitalist State, which defines exploitation as ‘the intolerably unjust extrac-
tion of value from another as part of a voluntary exchange transaction not otherwise 
prohibited by law’ (Reiff, 2013: 187). For reasons that are set forth at length in that book 
but that I won’t take the time to go over here, an extraction of value is ‘intolerably unjust’ 
if it exceeds 100% of the inflation-adjusted average total cost of what the good exchanged 
cost to produce. And arguably, students who end up earning high incomes may ultimately 
pay more than this amount.
But remember, this transaction is not a straight-forward exchange. Each student is 
receiving not only an education, but also a form of insurance policy – that is, a guarantee 
that she shall not have to pay more than a certain percentage of her income. The way that 
guarantee works, she could end up paying more, or she could end up paying less, but the 
average total cost of providing that guarantee must be figured on a cohort-wide basis, not 
an individual basis, for that is the way that costing out risk-pooling works. If this kind of 
insurance were deemed exploitive, all risk-pooling insurance would have to be – those 
who paid for insurance but did not suffer the covered loss (fire, death, financial loss, or 
whatever) would be exploited because they paid something and received nothing, and 
those who paid for the insurance and did suffer the covered loss would have exploited the 
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insurer because what they receive exceeds what they paid in premiums many times over. 
If we look at the cohort as a whole, in contrast, what the cohort will pay (absent extremely 
unusual circumstances) is nowhere near 100% more than the average total cost of provid-
ing education to the cohort as a whole.  This means that even those students who become 
very high earners and pay many times more than their individual education actually cost 
to produce on an inflation-adjusted basis have not been exploited, for what they have 
paid for is their education plus the cost of the relevant risk-pooling insurance, and if we 
figure this latter bit out on a cohort-wide rather than an individual basis, the amount paid 
is what it actually cost to produce.70
Returning now to possible practical rather than fairness objections to my proposal, 
yet another one of these is that adopting my proposal might limit the ability of public 
institutions to attract the top students. For example, a gifted student might obtain 
admission to Harvard or some other Ivy League or prestigious private university with 
a full scholarship, yet also be interested in attending Berkeley. (Note that this is pri-
marily a problem with regard to attracting gifted middle-class and wealthy students – 
few gifted poor students currently even apply to far-away private institutions, preferring 
instead to stay close to home no matter what (Leonhardt, 2013b).) But if all students 
admitted to Berkeley no matter how gifted must agree to pay 6% of their AGI during 
their prime earning years to the then owners of their cohort’s education securities, 
Berkeley will be at a disadvantage in trying to attract the best students vis-a-vis its 
equally prestigious private competitors. And we have already decided that we cannot 
allow opt-outs, because this would have an unpredictable effect on the cohort’s aver-
age salary and therefore would impair the marketability of its securities, so this poten-
tial solution is not open to us. But this does not mean there is nothing we can do here. 
Instead of offering gifted students a scholarship, what public institutions can do is give 
these students shares in their own cohort’s securities from the institution’s inventory. A 
student who receives enough shares to cover the cost of educating one student will be 
guaranteed that when the time to make her own payments comes due, all she will actu-
ally have to pay is the amount by which her own AGI exceeds the average AGI for her 
cohort.71 If she makes less than this, she will actually profit. Although this still leaves 
the risk that attending a public institution might end up being more expensive than 
attending a private institution with a scholarship, only a small minority of students will 
actually have to pay more, these payments are by definition easily affordable, and they 
occur far enough into the future that few students are likely to find this possibility suf-
ficiently concerning that they will alter their choice of which institution to attend if 
they feel the public institution actually offers the better education in their field of inter-
est.72 We could even protect against this possibility by buying insurance that would 
compensate the student if there were any shortfall.73
Other objections to my proposal might arise, and there may even be risks inherent in 
this method of financing that we may not be able to anticipate. So there is going to be 
some uncertainty about whether my proposal will work as anticipated until we have 
some experience of it actually doing so, and we won’t have that experience until the 
securities start paying off in 15 years. Once the system of financing has been established 
and actually pays off, this uncertainty will go away, but in the initial stages this fear of 
unanticipated risks may deter some investors. But given the attractiveness of these 
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investments, I don’t see how this fear could be widespread enough to prevent the offering 
of such securities from being successful. There is always a danger that unforeseen events 
may render even the most carefully thought out investment opportunity unsuccessful. 
But this is a risk that investors take every day, so I do not think the presence of this risk 
would in any way interfere with making these educational securities attractive. If there is 
some lingering concern about this, however, perhaps this system could be implemented 
experimentally in only certain states initially, and be adopted widely only after we have 
gained some experience with this method of financing and have a better understanding 
of whether any initially unforeseen problems are likely to come up. In any case, to pre-
vent the spread of any unforeseen risk here, we would make it illegal for anyone to buy 
or sell credit default swaps on these payment promises except as direct micro-hedges. In 
other words, people could buy swaps but only up to the amount of educational securities 
they actually own, and hold them only for so long as they hold the underlying securities. 
Buying speculative swaps (i.e. effectively insuring securities one does not own) would 
be illegal.74 This would ensure that people were able to hedge their investments if they 
wanted to but that any catastrophic failure of these investments would not spread as the 
sub-prime mortgage crisis did.
There is one last issue that I want to raise, although it is not really a potential objection 
but rather a point of clarification. And this is to ask whether public institutions should be 
given a monopoly on this kind of financing. (Obviously, this is only really an issue in the 
United States – in Europe, essentially all the relevant institutions would be public.) There 
is an argument for doing so, for private institutions do not necessarily release the same 
kind of information as public institutions, and what information they do release is often 
not as carefully scrutinized; therefore the chance of misstatements in the securities offer-
ings of private institutions would be greater. There is also the possibility that if private 
institutions were allowed to engage in this kind of financing, they could offer securities 
that would in some sense unfairly compete with those offered by public universities. So 
it might be necessary or at least advisable to bar private institutions from participating in 
this method of financing, at least initially. But I can see arguments on the other side too. 
It may be that there is no downside to allowing nonprofit private educational institutions 
to engage in this kind of financing even if, unlike public institutions, they were allowed 
to offer other methods of financing as well. Because we need not resolve the issue of 
private participation in this method of financing now, however, I will leave further dis-
cussion of this issue to another day. Suffice it to say for now that like all new methods of 
doing business, it is best to start utilizing the method envisioned by my proposal slowly 
so we can work out the kinks before we try to make it the new standard. So initially at 
least, this method of financing should be available only to public institutions (and in 
Europe, only to a portion of the eligible public institutions). Once we have sufficient 
experience to understand how a more widespread use of this method of financing would 
work, we can revisit the matter then.
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Notes
 1. See also Parker (2012), who notes that state funding for the University of California system 
has declined to the level it was at in 1997, when the system had 75,000 fewer students. A 
similar halving of government funding per student has happened in the United Kingdom. See 
Greenaway and Haynes (2003).
 2. See also Porter (2013a), who notes that in 2000 the United States was fourth among its peers 
in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in terms of the 
percentage of its population obtaining a degree from a 2- or 4-year institution, but by 2011 the 
United States had slipped to 11th place.
 3. What we are seeing is a ‘hollowing out’ of the job market. While the number of high-wage 
and low-wage jobs has grown rapidly as a result of technical innovation, the number of mid-
wage jobs – the kinds of jobs that we need if society is to produce and maintain a growing 
middle class – has lagged behind. See Autor (2010) and Autor and Dorn (2009).
 4. What this amounts to is a decline in American exceptionalism, for until ‘the early twen-
tieth century America educated its youth to a far greater extent than did most, if not 
every, European country. Secondary schools in America were free and generally acces-
sible, whereas they were costly and often inaccessible in most of Europe. Even by the 
1930s America was virtually alone in providing universally free and accessible secondary 
schools ... [And], ‘the United States expanded its lead in education in the twentieth century 
by instituting mass secondary schooling and then establishing a flexible and multifaceted 
higher education system’ (Goldin and Katz, 2008: 12, 18). 
Indeed, until about 1969 an education at the University of California was virtually free, higher 
fees being introduced and the long attack on 100% public funding beginning with the admin-
istration of Governor Ronald Regan. See Bady and Komczal (2012).
 5. For those who do want to investigate the causes of what has been happening here further, see, 
for example, Hofstadter (1963, esp. ch. 12).
 6. The same thing has been happening in the United Kingdom, where a higher education system 
that was at one time free to all has been slowly moving toward the American system, where 
the best universities charge high fees supposedly ameliorated by scholarships for the poorest 
students and large student loans for the middle class. See, for example, Shepherd (2010). For 
criticism of this change in higher education funding in the United Kingdom, see Million + and 
London Economics (2013), which argues that reducing direct funding for higher education 
and switching to higher fees paid for by student loans will actually cost the UK Treasury six 
times more than it saves as well as lead to higher inflation.
 7. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
 8. On the identification of prime earning years, see Political Calculations (2007). We could, of 
course, use a shorter period, say either 35–44 or 45–54, depending on whether we thought a 
shorter period of payment at somewhat higher rates or a longer period of payment at lower 
rates was preferable, and whether it was better to start payments sooner rather than later. But 
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while average income might not vary much between the two periods, the 35–44 group is 
likely to have higher child-care costs, and thus it does not seem wise to impose a higher rate 
of repayment on them. On the other hand, freeing them of any payment obligation whatsoever 
and imposing this exclusively on the older group means we have an awfully long time to wait 
until payments start rolling in. So for purposes of this article, I will go with the full 20-year 
period of payment. But it does not seem that there are significant moral issues riding on this 
choice one way or the other. Those who think some other choice might be better are free to 
recalculate the figures I present and make their argument for another of these alternatives.
 9. There is, however, one special feature of graduate education that I do want to mention. Unlike 
other graduate programs, most law schools are profit centers for their universities. In other 
words, law schools often bring in more money in fees than their average total cost per student, 
the excess being used to finance other aspects of the university’s operations. But I am not sug-
gesting that there is anything wrong with this. On the contrary, I am mentioning this simply 
because it is an attempt to accomplish the same thing indirectly that my proposal would do 
directly – that is, make those who earn more trading on their education pay more for it. And 
while some are concerned that law school fees have gotten so high now that it may no longer 
make economic sense to attend law school (see, for example, Bronner, 2013), this problem 
would not arise were we to follow my proposal rather than simply try to tweak the current 
system.
10. One other theorist has independently developed and floated a similar idea, although his 
notion of an equity participation seems to be far more limited than mine (see Zingales, 
2012b). Zingales also mentions this proposal in his book, but he gives no further details 
of it there (see Zingales, 2012a: 152). Given the lack of details in his proposal, it is unfor-
tunately not possible for me to make an informed comparison of Zingales’ proposal and 
mine.
11. See, for example, Autor and Dorn (2013): ‘Spurred by growing demand for workers perform-
ing abstract job tasks, the payoff for college and professional degrees has soared; despite its 
formidable price tag, higher education has perhaps never been a better investment’; Rampell 
(2012c, 2012b, 2013a, 2013c, 2013d), O’Brien (2012), Horn et al. (2012) and U.S. Department 
of the Treasury (2012) (median weekly earnings for a full-time, full-year bachelor’s degree 
holder in 2011 were 64% higher than those for a high-school graduate – US$1,053 compared 
to US$638); Rampell (2012a) (even factoring in debt, the return on investment for the student 
going back to school is greater than that from investing the same tuition money in the stock 
market, long-term Treasury bills, housing, corporate bonds, or gold); and Tankersley (2012) 
(noting that education, not merely working hard, is now the key to moving up). And a higher 
income is not the only benefit of higher education. Life expectancy is also greater for those 
with a higher education (see Tavernise, 2012).
12. Because everyone pays the same percentage, this financing scheme is not redistributive, at 
least not in the strict sense, but by making education more accessible to the poor and middle 
class than it is now it will indirectly have some redistributive effects. Nevertheless, these 
are side effects, not objectives of the plan. For a direct response to the problem of economic 
inequality and suggestions about what we should do about it, see Reiff (2013).
13. See Wolff (1998), who argues that luck egalitarianism undermines the egalitarian ethos by 
forcing the unlucky to engage in shameful revelation about their inability to support them-
selves in order to get government assistance. See also Wolff (2010: 343–346). For a contem-
porary example of just this problem, see Lieber (2012b) (describing the lengths a disabled 
unemployed man with serious health problems must go to in order to get his student loans 
discharged in bankruptcy).
14. See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2012).
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15. For more on this method of construction, see generally Das (2005: ch. 4).
16. Contrast this with one of the proposals currently under consideration to privatize student debt 
in the United Kingdom: the rate on outstanding student loans would be retroactively raised, 
requiring what could be years of extra repayments even for those who left university long ago, 
and the loans would then be sold to private investors. See Chakrabortty (2013).
17. State governments will have something constructive left to do too, but I will get to that in a 
moment.
18. This is probably the biggest problem with Oregon’s ‘Pay it Forward, Pay it Back’ initiative 
that proposes using a similar method to finance public higher education, although the Oregon 
plan also provides that repayments would begin much sooner than I have proposed (4 years 
instead of 15 years after graduation), take longer but be made at a lesser rate, and most impor-
tantly, instead of shifting the burden of bridge financing and defaults to the market it leaves 
this mostly on the state. See Dudley (2013). For these and other criticisms of the Oregon plan, 
see Holt (2013).
19. The default rate would certainly be less than the default rate on student loans, which is cur-
rently 7.9% (see Weissmann, 2012a), given the fact that the amount to be paid is pegged to 
income. This in itself would offer potential savings of up to US$1.4b in inflation-adjusted 
dollars, which is what the US Department of Education alone paid to collection agencies and 
other groups to hunt down defaulters. See Martin (2012c). In any event, a similar enforcement 
approach has been successful at keeping defaults to a minimum in Australia, where student 
loan repayments are contingent on income. See Norton (2013).
20. For example, Treasury Inflation Protected Securities, or ‘TIPS’, are currently (as of December 
2012) offering a negative 0.75% rate of return (9/28/12 nine year TIPS bond due 7/15/22), 
meaning that unless inflation increased more than this before the end of the term, an investor 
would get back less money in real dollars than he or she invested. Yet these investments have 
no trouble selling.
21. See, for example, Porter (2012): ‘Investing in children is not just a matter of fairness but of eco-
nomic vitality . . . Investing in education is about as good an investment as a society can make’.
22. See, generally, Bowles et al. (2005) and Chapman and Ryan (2005), who show that income-
contingent plans improve access to higher education for middle and lower income students.
23. See Lieber (2013), who concludes that students who work fewer than 30 hours per week are 
1.4 times more likely to graduate within 6 years and their grades are likely to be better too 
(Martin and Lehren, 2012).
24. See Stiglitz (2013): ‘Young people from families of modest means face a Catch-22: without 
a college education, they are condemned to a life of poor prospects; with a college educa-
tion, they may be condemned to a lifetime of living on the brink’; and DeParle (2012), who 
describes the problems of poor students now burdened by crushing debt and still unable to 
finish their educations.
25. The proposal to tie interest rates to the market rather than leave them at the fixed rate previ-
ously set by Congress is in part a reaction to the fact that interest rates have now dropped 
so low that many students who have borrowed through the program are paying more than 
they would be if they were repaying private adjustable loans – indeed, so much more that 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the Department of Education will earn a 
US$51b profit this year from the student loan program, more than the nation’s most profitable 
companies and roughly equal to the profits enjoyed by the four largest US banks combined. 
See Nasiripour (2013). Tying rates to the market will prevent this in the future, but it will also 
leave students subject to swings in the other direction – for most of the history of the student 
loan program the fixed rate has been lower than the market rate; now that subsidy will no 
longer be available.
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26. Associated Press (2013c) (quoting Federal Reserve Bank of New York quarterly report on 
consumer credit).
27. And this rapid increase in student debt shows no sign of abating. See Associated Press (2013a) 
(noting that since January 2011, the amount of outstanding student and auto loans has risen 
by US$312.6b, whereas other forms of consumer debt have risen only by US$16b); Reuters 
(2013) (but ‘student debt rose again, with outstanding balances up $8 billion to $994 billion 
in the second quarter’); Associated Press (2013d) (while credit card debt is now 17% below 
its peak in July 2008, the auto and student loan debt category, which is not separately broken 
down, is up 8.1% since last year, has risen every month but one since May 2010, and is now 
at a record high of US$2t).
28. This issue is further explored in Bös (2000) and Buchanan (1963).
29. Of course, this would require responsible use of the money saved. Not only would the legisla-
ture have to use some of this money to support elementary and secondary education, it would 
also have to do a much better job distributing these funds equitably than it currently does. See 
Porter (2013b) (noting that among the 34 OECD nations, only the United States, Israel and 
Turkey give more educational resources to schools serving rich students than to schools serv-
ing poor students). My proposal is therefore not ‘legislature proof’. If the legislature wants 
to pander to voters by returning all the savings my proposal would create in the form of tax 
cuts, or if it wants to distribute these savings inequitably, it is free to do so. Of course, there 
is much more to say about what form of distribution would be equitable, but that will have 
to wait for another day. No matter what, however, even if politics intrudes and adopting my 
proposal turns out not to help K-12 education (or not help as much as it could), my proposal 
would still ensure that public higher education is adequately funded and open to all.
30. The United Kingdom and certain other European Union (EU) nations that also have highly 
developed and successful higher education systems would be prime candidates for financing 
their systems in a similar manner. Because of the free movement of citizens within the EU, 
however, enabling legislation would have to be enacted both by the country issuing the rele-
vant education securities and the EU itself, since all EU member states would have to agree to 
lend their taxation and regulatory infrastructure to ensure payment of the promised amounts 
no matter where each student ends up working. Students who were to attend the issuing uni-
versities from outside the EU would be excluded from the program and would have to pay for 
their education up front, as they do now, unless acceptable mutual enforcement agreements 
with their home states, and perhaps even their home regions, were made.
31. Even more of this burden would be borne by the taxpayers if an Obama administration pro-
posal to expand this program to allow forgiveness of previously ineligible loans were to 
become law. See Mitchell and Belkin (2013). But this is exactly why this proposal is unlikely 
to become law, and why the loan forgiveness route is unlikely to ever command sufficient 
Congressional support to provide a solution to the ongoing problem of how to pay for higher 
education.
32. For a description of the Australian Plan and some of its effects, see Chapman and Ryan 
(2005).
33. A similar approach has been recommended by the Liberal Democrats in the United Kingdom. 
Under the Lib Dem proposal, education would require no up-front payments, and a student 
would only begin to contribute to offsetting the prior cost of their education once that student 
reaches a certain income level (in this case £21,000 per annum). But while the system of 
contribution proposed is somewhat progressive, it tops out at £50,000, thereby leaving high 
earners contributing a smaller proportion of their income than those in the middle income 
brackets, and it also still leaves the taxpayers funding a good deal of the actual cost. See, for 
example, Liberal Democrats (2009, 2012).
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34. President Obama has proposed eliminating this particular tax as part of an extension of the 
cap and forgive program, but at this point that proposal seems to have little chance of success.
35. The idea for such a method of financing is usually sourced to Friedman (1955). See Krueger 
and Bowen (1993: 194 n. 1). The seed of this idea, however, actually goes back even earlier 
than this. See Friedman and Kuznets (1945: esp. p. 90).
36. One simulation puts these costs at about 50% of the total amount the government lends or 
guarantees. See Barr (2004: sec. 3).
37. For further discussion of the various income-contingent student loan programs in effect 
throughout the world, see Johnstone (2005) and Chapman (2005). See also Barr (1993) and 
Reischauer (1989: 33–55).
38. On the importance of framing in these situations, see Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and 
Thaler (1999).
39. For more on loss aversion, see Tversky and Kahneman (1991) and Kahneman et al. (1991).
40. Future discounting refers to our well-documented tendency to discount future benefits and 
burdens excessively when balancing them against benefits or burdens available now. See 
Reiff (2005: 86–87), Elster (2000: 25–26) and Nozick (1993: 14–15).
41. It is not clear from the proposal whether this rate of interest would be the market rate or a 
subsidized rate.
42. For a variation on this proposal, see Barr (2010).
43. Indeed, it seems that the problem of adequately securing an investment in individual human 
capital, despite the obvious attraction of having such an interest (see Friedman and Kuznets, 
1945: 90), is what has prevented the idea of using equity rather than debt to finance public 
higher education from being taken forward for some time. See Friedman (1955: 100–104).
44. But we do not have to do this. There is actually no need for these investment vehicles to be 
limited to the students of a single state’s university system. For California, it makes sense to 
do so, but for smaller, less populous states, or states where each campus has very different 
characteristics, it may make sense to allow them to join with the campuses of similarly situ-
ated state universities in other states and offer securities on a joint basis. The important thing 
for each such consortium is that average total cost per student and average income are cur-
rently similar.
45. Actually, the current yearly cost per student is closer to US$15,000. The US$20,000 figure is 
what providing an education cost in inflation-adjusted dollars in the University of California 
system for the 1990–1991 academic year, when the amount spent per student was near its 
height (see UC Office of the President, 2011; University of California, 2012–2013: 13). 
Because we are trying to restore funding to a more acceptable level, however, the higher 
figure is the one I have chosen to use. If one used the lower figure, this would simply make 
all the calculations that follow on even more attractive.
46. Note that we already finance some fixed costs of higher education through the market by 
issuing what are called ‘tuition revenue bonds’, or sometimes ‘general revenue bonds’. About 
20 states now use this type of financing for capital projects for institutions of higher learn-
ing, including California (see Adams, 2013). If we wanted to continue to use this method of 
financing fixed costs we could continue to do so, and this would drop the percentage of future 
income that students would have to contribute during their prime earning years significantly, 
but it would also leave the taxpayer on the hook for these fixed costs for, tuition is not typi-
cally used to actually pay off these bonds. Instead, they are merely secured by tuition should 
the bond issuer default. The bonds are actually serviced by grants from the state legislature 
out of the general fund, as they are in Texas (see Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 
2010), or by the issuing university out of non-tuition revenue, as in California (see Press 
Release, 2010). In any case, there is nothing about issuing the education securities I have in 
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mind that is inconsistent with continuing to employ either of these bond financing methods, 
should we decide this is what we want to do. Nor would my method of financing be incon-
sistent with using such a method of bond financing even if the bonds were serviced through 
tuition receipts. In that case, a portion of the revenue for each securities offering would simply 
have to go to existing bondholders to cover whatever current payments were due and the cost 
of this figured into designing the securities.
47. Of course, I have used the target rate as a stand-in for the expected rate of inflation simply 
for purposes of illustration – it is the expected rate of inflation at the time, not the target rate, 
that would be used to calculate our base figure. And the expected rate should be based on the 
Higher Education Price Index (HEPI), not the Consumer Price Index (CPI), for the former is 
a more accurate measure of education costs. See Griswold (2006).
48. See also Mishel et al. (2012: esp. p. 59, Table 2.1 (showing general rise in average real 
income)).
49. For those interested in making this calculation themselves, the relevant data can be down-
loaded from The World Top Incomes Database at http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/
topincomes/#Database (select average income per tax unit). Note that median income has 
fallen somewhat over the last 10 years, but not average income, meaning that society has 
become more unequal. But this is a reason to support my proposal, not reject it.
50. The University of Manchester in the United Kingdom, for example, is currently issuing 
£300m in bonds due 2053 that pay 4.25%, meaning that purchasers who buy these bonds are 
betting that a 4.25% return will cover both inflation and provide them a profit. See StaffNet 
(2013). If the Manchester bonds can clear the market, then a security that offers a 3% return 
over inflation at even less risk, which is effectively what I am proposing, should do so easily.
51. It is not quite like this, because payments don’t start straight away but in 15 years, and the 3% 
real rate of return assumes payments do begin right away, so the effective real rate of return 
on these securities using this method of calculation would be less than 3%. But it should still 
be enough to make our securities attractive, or at least attractive enough to try in our initial 
offering.
52. Mid-career salaries for six of the University of California (UC) campuses are actually higher 
than this. The exact figures are as follows: Berkeley (US$111,000); San Diego (US$101,000); 
Irvine (US$97,200); Davis (US$97,000); Santa Barbara (US$96,200); University of 
California, Los Angeles (UCLA) (US$95,300); Riverside (US$83,100); and Santa Cruz 
(US$77,500). See PayScale (2013–2014). And both Riverside and Santa Cruz are much 
smaller than the other campuses – indeed, taken together they are smaller than UCLA alone. 
So the US$90,000 figure is actually very conservative for the system as a whole.
53. For those who would like to see this calculation spelled out in more mathematical language, 
here it is: the percentage amount Px of future AGI to be securitized equals the percentage 
amount Py of current average AGI for graduates of this institution/s C that would produce 
amount X, where X equals the yearly payment amount A on a hypothetical loan at base amount 
B over set number of years to repayment once payments begin N at real rate of return R, where 
base amount B equals current average total cost of education E times average number of years 
to graduation times the expected rate of inflation Ie for this period.
54. Some of these securities would no doubt be purchased by the university itself out of its 
endowment – for why not invest in itself? Perhaps each university might purchase the entire 
equity tranche (these would consist of a relatively small percentage of the offering, perhaps 2 
or 3 but certainly less than 10%), and leave the more risk-free tranches to the market, or per-
haps each university would want to purchase some securities from each tranche. Regardless 
of the tranche from which these securities came, however, the return on risk for the university 
would be better than almost any other security the university could possibly purchase, for a 
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3% real return is better than most universities earn even if they have individually managed 
endowments. See Stewart (2012), Martin (2012b) and National Association of College and 
University Business Officers and Commonfund Institute (2011) (showing average endow-
ment performance over 10-year period equivalent to between 0% and 2.2% real rate of return).
55. This does not mean that the offering institutions will be clueless as to how much money the 
offering is likely to raise until it is over. As with all securities offerings, the investment banker 
acting for the offeror will usually be able to provide a fairly accurate estimate of how the 
market will react to the offering (this is what they get paid for), and (if the bank also acts as an 
underwriter) it will also guarantee a certain minimum (again, this is what they get paid for). 
If the underwriter makes a mistake here, it may take a bath, but this rarely happens, and the 
offering university gets its money no matter what. And while there may be some uncertainty 
regarding the popularity of these securities the first time they are offered, this will largely be 
eliminated thereafter. In any case, whatever uncertainty does exist, even at the initial offer-
ing, it will be no greater than the uncertainty stemming from the possibility of budget cuts 
or increases that result from last minute shifts in the political and economic landscape. If 
anything, public universities should have a more secure and predictable basis for future budg-
etary planning than they have now, not less.
56. This is because the income distribution of each cohort is likely to highly skew. In other words, 
rather than a normal distribution, where the median and the mean are at or near the same point 
and the number of observations rise to and then decline from the center, it is more likely that 
there will be a few very high earners that increase the mean but hardly change the median at 
all. Thus, the number of people who pay substantially more on their promise than a typical 
security would generate is likely to be small. And they simply should pay more, since they 
have benefited more from their education, and have overwhelmingly greater means than the 
vast number of their classmates.
57. Note that this adjustment is already required of anyone filing a California tax return. See 
Franchise Tax Board, Instructions for Schedule CA (540).
58. For a discussion of the current tax treatment of tuition and other education expenses, see IRS 
Publication 970 (2013).
59. One way to ensure this is to put the name of the government official (actually, not nominally) 
in charge of reviewing and approving each particular offering on the offering itself. (Not the 
name of the political appointee in charge of the agency or the division with regulatory respon-
sibility, but the actual individual assigned within the agency to perform the review of the 
particular offering.) The reputational concern this generates should be more than sufficient to 
ensure that regulatory review is appropriately stringent.
60. For further discussion of my views on the unemployment problem, see my On Unemployment 
(in progress).
61. Following the preparation and circulation of the initial draft of this article, I became aware 
that Chris LoCascio, editor of the student newspaper at the University of California Riverside, 
had recently floated an equity participation proposal that contained some of the same ele-
ments as mine. See FixUC: UC Student Investment Proposal (http://www.fixuc.org/). While 
the original FixUC proposal did not include any provision for how student promises to pay 
would be enforced, in a later amendment LoCascio did propose an enforcement role for the 
IRS. Rather than raise money through securitization, however, the FixUC proposal assumed 
student payments would go to the university directly, starting as soon as each student became 
employed. I have my doubts that such an approach would be feasible or that the numbers 
would work out as LoCascio suggests given the lower income to which his proposed 5% rate 
of payment, which would itself be subject to various credits, caps, and adjustments, would 
attach. The FixUC proposal also provided that a specified portion of the state budget be 
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devoted to education, something which might be thought admirable but which is probably 
unenforceable and almost certainly politically infeasible. Besides, it seems to me that this 
kind of microeconomic management is a political decision that is more properly left up to the 
electorate and their representatives, rather than something that should be fixed in stone as a 
constitutional requirement. In any event, it seems that the mammoth effort required to do this 
would only create an unnecessary distraction from the effort to encourage a rethinking of the 
available methods of education finance. My proposal and that of FixUC also differ in many 
other ways, both large and small. Nevertheless, some of the important basic ideas contained 
in my article and even some of the arguments for these ideas can also be found in the FixUC 
proposal in one form or another. Anyone interested in these ideas would accordingly benefit 
from further study of the FixUC proposal.
62. See also Weissmann (2012b). Unemployment rates follow a similar pattern. See Carnevale 
and Cheah (2013).
63. Note, however, that these figures do not account for the fact that many students who choose 
an ostensibly less lucrative undergraduate major often go on to graduate school (some 41%) 
and therefore ultimately end up earning a very good income. Because their admission to 
graduate school is largely dependent on their performance as an undergraduate, their ulti-
mate incomes should indeed be tied to their ostensibly less lucrative undergraduate educa-
tion, at least in part (see Carnevale et al., 2013: 132–134). Thus, the comparison only looks 
as bad as it does for the humanities and the arts if we look just at those who achieve nothing 
more than an undergraduate degree. For reasons I will get to in a moment, however, the 
more accurate and no doubt smaller all-things-considered differences in income-generating 
potential between undergraduate majors in their prime earning years turns out not to matter 
anyway for purposes of the argument I am making here, so I will not discuss these figures 
further.
64. In light of this, why continue to call these institutions of higher education ‘public’? Well, I 
suppose we could call them anything we want, but there are still good reasons to think of 
them as public: they are funded by the public in the same way that publicly traded companies 
are, and they are also public in the sense they are open to the public at no cost at the point of 
entry while private institutions are not. And government would, of course, be free to provide 
subsidies to the education services provided by these institutions too, thereby keeping the 
percentage promise required from incoming students down. Finally, it would be a mistake to 
underestimate the importance of the enforcement and administrative services the government 
will provide in any case; without these services the plan will not work, and the cost for this 
will most likely be borne by the public. But the word itself is not important – if some other 
term strikes someone as a more appropriate way to refer to institutions financed in this way 
they are free to use it.
65. See Delbanco (2012: 26): ‘Among those who do get to college, high-achieving students from 
affluent families are four times more likely to attend a selective college than students from 
poor families with comparable grades and test scores’; Gerald and Haycock (2006); and Satz 
(2007: 624): ‘At elite colleges, those at the bottom 28 percent of the socioeconomic scale 
make up only 3 percent of the student population’ (footnote omitted).
66. For a list of mid-career incomes by Cal State campus, see PayScale (2013–2014).
67. If there was, this might indicate that more resources were being consumed by lesser insti-
tutions than their accomplishments deserve, and so we might want to engage in some re-
budgeting before we made this method of financing available, but I don’t see how this would 
indicate there is something wrong with the method of financing itself. Indeed, the 6% figure 
(the amount required to cover current average total costs given current average income dur-
ing prime earning years for previous cohorts) provides a useful ‘rough guide’ for telling us 
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whether a university is conducting itself in a financially responsible fashion or borrowing 
excessively in order to lure more or better students (see Martin, 2012a). It can also be used 
as a way of telling us when other fixed costs like administrative salaries have grown too high 
relative to the value of the education services provided.
68. Borrowing to buy cars and to attend school, for example, continues to rise and reached 
a seasonally adjusted record of US$2.77t in November 2012. See Associated Press 
(2013b).
69. To put this in Rawlsian terms, the question here is whether requiring some currently poor 
students to pay later when they would not have to pay anything ever under the current system 
is in effect making the least advantaged worse off, something that would violate the principle 
of economic justice Rawls calls ‘the difference principle’. According to that principle, social 
and economic inequalities are justified only if they work to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged, meaning that some lesser degree of inequality would make the least advantaged 
even worse off (see Rawls, 1971, rev. ed. 1999: 65–73, 2001: 42–43, 61–66). To apply this 
principle, however, we must decide when the determination is to be made before we can 
determine who the least advantaged are. If everyone must pay up front, those who have few 
current financial resources now are at least arguably the least advantaged. But if everyone 
only pays 10–15 years into the future, and then only a set, modest percentage of their income, 
it seems that current family wealth is irrelevant to deciding who is the least advantaged. That 
determination must instead be made at the time payments begin, and at that time it is the cur-
rent resources of the student himself or herself, not the long-ago resources of his or her family, 
that matter. There is accordingly nothing in my proposal that makes the relevant group of least 
advantaged worse off as a group than they would be under the current system, regardless of 
its effect on particular individuals.
70. For a discussion of the nonexploitive pricing of similar insurance schemes, see Reiff (2013: 
248–249).
71. This assumes, of course, that there are no adverse tax consequences that prevent the payments 
in and payments out from cancelling each other out, but that is simply something that we will 
have to ensure as part of the enabling legislation that will need to be enacted to operationalize 
my proposal.
72. Remember also that the best high-school students are not necessarily the ones most likely to 
go on and earn high incomes. Michael Bloomberg, for example, who is now the most gener-
ous living donor to any educational institution in the United States, having given a staggering 
US$1.1b to his alma mater, Johns Hopkins, was ‘a middling high school student . . . who had 
settled for C’s’. See Barbaro (2013).
73. This, for example, is what public universities might do for gifted athletes to ensure they 
do not pay any more than they would on an athletic scholarship to a private university. Of 
course, public universities could also ensure there is no deficiency simply by offering athletes 
as well as academically gifted students more shares in their cohort’s securities than would 
cover just one student’s education, but my view is this should be prohibited, for we do not 
want to allow bidding wars for these students to become unlimited. Public institutions could 
still offer scholarships to cover living expenses or provide housing or other subsidies for their 
best students, however, as well as to student athletes, for these are not covered by the relevant 
securities, and the university can offer partial scholarships too in the form of shares worth 
something less that the average total cost of educating a single student, so there is as much 
flexibility here in designing incentives under my proposal as there is now where scholarships 
largely take the form of cash payments or credits.
74. For further discussion of and argument for, this see Reiff (2013: ch. 6).
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